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Cindy Stewart 
 
Police Intervention in Mental Health Crisis: A Case Study of the 
Bloomington Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Program 
 
Owing to the closure of state mental hospitals and limited funding for mental 
health programs, police increasingly must respond to calls involving persons in mental 
health crisis. Unfortunately, police officers often do not have the skills or the resources to 
respond effectively.   As a result, many mentally ill persons are arrested and subsequently 
incarcerated leading to an endemic problem of jails and prisons acting as “the new 
asylums.”  In many communities, police and mental health service providers have joined 
forces to address this problem.  One response, which first emerged in Memphis, 
Tennessee, is Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training for police officers. Programs 
modeled on the Memphis CIT training have been adopted across the United States.  
Indeed, several states are currently considering mandating that all state and local police 
agencies provide CIT training to their officers. As the program has spread, however, 
police agencies have adapted the Memphis Model in different ways.  As a result, there is 
no national model or standard for what constitutes CIT training.  In particular, there are 
questions about what the role of mental health advocates should be in designing the CIT 
training, whether all police officers in a department or only volunteers should receive CIT 
training, and how the training can be adapted for cities of different size.  Moreover, little 
is known about whether CIT training actually improves police officers’ responses to 
persons in mental health crisis.  Building on two pilot studies this research combines 
qualitative and quantitative data to address these questions of content and effectiveness.  
This study examines the larger community context of one CIT program through 
interviews and focus groups with police officers, medical personnel and community 
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members. In addition, this study utilizes data from officer-completed incident response 
sheets to examine the effects of CIT training.  Specifically, the study addresses  (1) 
whether CIT training affects how frequently officers report persons as having a mental 
illness, (2) how officers respond to and resolve incidents involving persons whom they 
believe to be in mental health crisis, and (3) whether there are differences in responses 
between CIT and non-CIT trained officers.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 Owing to the closure of state mental hospitals and limited funding for mental 
health programs, police increasingly respond to calls involving persons in mental health 
crisis. Unfortunately, police officers often do not have the skills or the resources to 
respond effectively.   As a result, many mentally ill persons are arrested and subsequently 
incarcerated leading to an endemic problem of jails and prisons acting as “the new 
asylums.”  In many communities, police and mental health service providers have joined 
forces to address this problem.   
Over the past 20 years, state and local police agencies have developed programs 
to improve officers’ responses to calls involving persons with mental illness.  Crisis 
Intervention Team (CIT) training, developed in Memphis, Tennessee, has emerged as the 
leading police response model.   The objectives of the Memphis Model of CIT are to help 
officers recognize symptoms of mental illness, increase their use of mental health 
alternatives to arrest, and promote the physical safety of both officers and mentally ill 
citizens during police interactions.  The Memphis Model has been endorsed by mental 
health providers, mental health advocates, and many police agencies (Bowers, 2001; 
Compton, 2008; Hails, 2003; Munetz, 2006).  As a result, it has gained recognition as the 
exemplary program for improving police interactions with mentally ill citizens.  
 Despite its rapid spread, little is known about the CIT implementation process, 
the organizational linkages the program establishes, and whether CIT training actually 
improves police officers’ responses to persons in mental health crisis.  In addition, while 
most police agencies purport to implement the Memphis Model of CIT, it is unclear 
whether the core elements (Dupont, Cochran & Pillsbury, 2007) of the program are 
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adhered to or whether, and how, the agency adapts the model to fit local needs. The 
purpose of this study is to help fill this gap in knowledge about a significant criminal 
justice policy innovation through an intensive case study of one CIT program.    
 Building on two pilot studies and drawing on Watson’s et al. (2008) and 
Morabito’s (2007) multi-level conceptualization of CIT, this case study explored the 
community and organizational context in which the program was implemented and 
further managed and effects of the Bloomington CIT program.  As part of the multi-level 
conceptual framework of analysis, this study utilized focus groups and interviews to 
explore the meaning the policy makers, officers, mental health professionals and 
community members attach to the implementation of the CIT program and the 
community context in which the program functions. 
 In addition, this study analyzed data from officer-completed incident response 
sheets to examine the effects of CIT training.  Specifically, the study utilized multivariate 
statistical techniques to address 1) whether CIT training affects how officers respond to 
and resolve incidents involving persons in mental health crisis, and 2) whether there were 
differences between CIT and non-CIT trained officers.  
 The overall purpose of this study is to provide an in-depth examination of one 
Crisis Intervention Team training program.  Through the use of mixed-methods, the CIT 
implementation process is explored and mental health crisis call outcomes are examined. 
1.2 An Overview of the Memphis Model of CIT 
 
As a result of the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, police are increasingly 
required to confront mental health crisis in the field.  Current research indicates that 
police departments around the country have seen an increase in the number of hours 
police officers spend dealing with mentally ill individuals on the street.  For example 
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Reuland and Cheney (2005) report that "the New York Police Department responds to a 
call involving a person with mental illness every 6.5 minutes"; in Florida, police officers 
transported individuals with mental illness for involuntary confinement and examination 
over 40,000 times in one year; and in 1996, Los Angeles police officers spent over 
28,000 hours a month on calls involving the mentally ill (Reuland & Cheney, 2005).  In 
their ground breaking work, Teplin & Pruett (1992) established that police arrested 
persons with mental illness at a significantly higher rate than non-mentally ill persons or 
acted as street corner psychiatrists by informally handling a situation rather than 
transporting persons to mental health facilities (but see Engle & Silver, 2001 challenging 
the criminalization of mental illness hypothesis).  Police officers often chose arrest or 
informal measures to control a mental health crisis because there were few alternatives 
available.   
 This problematic situation was confirmed when a mentally ill man was fatally 
shot by police officers in Memphis, Tennessee.  Directly after this event, the Director of  
the Memphis Police Department publicly reported:  
 ● The police department was ill equipped to handle the seriously mentally ill 
 ● Family members of the mentally ill distrusted police 
 ● The criminal justice system and the mental health system were adversaries 
 ● Police response to crises involving the mentally ill often resulted in injury and 
arrest (LDDA, 1998) 
 
Following this report, an alliance was formed between the Memphis Police 
Department, the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) and area mental health 
services that resulted in the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) program that is currently 
being modeled by police departments across the United States.  The Memphis Model of 
CIT was designed to train police officers to be "first responders" for calls involving 
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persons with mental illness.  In addition, one key component of this model was the 
collaboration between the police department and area medical facilities; area medical 
facilities agreed to provide access to mental health services when officers identified that 
medical intervention was required and to accept individuals for assessment and treatment 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, allowing the officer to return to the street. 
The Memphis Model of CIT training was originally based on a 40-hour class that 
officers would volunteer to attend.  The training had four main goals (LDDA, 1998): 
 ● To help police officers recognize symptoms of mental illness 
 ● To help police officers recognize alcohol and drug addictions 
 ● To help police officers gain an appreciation for consumer and family members’ 
  perspectives 
 ● To help police officers gain verbal de-escalation techniques 
 
In addition, the program had three overarching objectives: 
 
 ● Increase officer and civilian safety 
 ● Diversion from incarceration in jail to mental health treatment facilities 
 ● Positive outcomes for subjects and reduced need for officer intervention 
 • Decrease symptoms of mental illness, arrest rates and drug/alcohol use 
 • Increase consumer satisfaction with police and mental health services 
 
Over time, police departments across the United States adapted and implemented 
the CIT training; it is estimated that over 400 CIT programs are operating in the United 
States (Oliva, 2008; Compton, 2008).  Nonetheless, since there is not a national standard 
for CIT training, many police departments across the country have opted to retain the 
overarching goals of the Memphis Model, while at the same time adapting the content of 
the training to fit the needs of the local police department and local community 
(Compton, 2008; Hails & Borum 2003; also, personal conversations with police 
administrators). 
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While research on CIT is limited, there is a growing body of literature that 
examines pre- and post-booking programs designed to divert subjects from jail, officer 
attitudes and perceptions of persons with mental illness, and a small body of literature 
examining arrest of persons with mental illness. The few studies that are available on CIT 
have predominately utilized police officer and consumer self-report and pre/post CIT 
training surveys.  Many of the studies do not focus specifically on examining the CIT 
program, the programs impact on mental health crisis outcomes, or the context within 
which the CIT program functions. While research on CIT is still in its infancy, many 
police agencies have or are considering its implementation.  Given the fervor with which 
this program is adopted, it is increasingly important to systematically examine the 
research that has been conducted and consider directions for future research. The 
following review provides an assessment of the available literature that is relevant to CIT 
and its outcomes, and reviews suggested directions for future research. 
1.3 Literature Review 
1.3.1 Program Comparisons 
 In order to determine which response model might be the most effective in 
responding to mental health crisis calls, Steadman (2000) examined disparate programs: 
the Memphis, Tennessee police-based-specialized response (CIT), the Birmingham, 
Alabama police-based specialized response through community service officers, and the 
Knoxville, Tennessee mental-health-based specialized response. The Knoxville model, 
where a team of mental health professionals responded to police calls for support, was 
found to be the least effective of the three models.  Steadman (2000) reported that 
approximately 40% of mental health crisis calls received a specialized response (p. 647) 
and that police expressed frustration about the long delays in the support team’s arrival 
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on the scene. In addition, 36% of the cases supported by the medical team on the scene 
were referred to other mental health specialists for further intervention (p. 647-648).  
 The Birmingham model, where community service officers respond to police calls 
for support, had an even lower rate of response (28%) due to the lack of alternative 
dispositions which severely restricted specialized response; however, this model resulted 
in 64% of the incidents being resolved on the scene and requiring no further intervention 
(Steadman, 2000, p. 647-648). 
 The Memphis Model of CIT, where specially training police officers responded 
directly to the mental health crisis call, resulted in a 95% response rate, tended to 
stabilize on the scene less than the other sites (23% of calls), and were more likely to 
transport the person in crisis to a mental health treatment facility (75% of cases).  Thus, 
Steadman (2000) suggests that the Memphis Model of CIT is more effective than the 
other response strategies (p. 647-649). 
 In 2003, Lattimore et al. compared eight pre- and post-booking strategies.  
Lattimore et al., found that subjects in both the pre- and post-booking programs were 
similar on most mental health indicators, with the exception of measures of social 
functioning and substance abuse.  This study concluded that each of the response 
strategies targeted different populations.  Subjects in the pre-booking programs tended to 
be  
“more educated, more involved with employment, and generally more 
satisfied with their lives, health, and finances…were less often arrested, 
less involved with treatment…less likely to use emergency rooms for 
mental health problems, less likely to be prescribed psychotropic 
medications, and less seriously involved with drugs and 
alcohol”(Lattimore et al., 2003, p. 58).  
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 In comparison, the subjects in the post-booking programs tended to be “more 
functionally impaired,” requiring greater supervision and coercion to comply with mental 
health treatment (Lattimore et al., 2003, p. 58). Lattimore et al. concluded that 
deciphering whether one strategy was more effective than the other was not yet possible 
with current data as each program targeted markedly different populations. 
 The Technical Assistance and Policy Analysis (TAPA) Center for Jail Diversion 
acknowledges that “pre- and post-booking diversion programs tend to target different 
populations” (TAPA, 2004, p. 5); however, their study did not make a distinction 
between these strategies.  Instead, looking at groups that were diverted from jail and 
groups that were not diverted from jail, they found that diverted subjects spend more time 
in the community and received significantly more mental health treatment. Interestingly, 
however, there were no significant differences in improved mental health symptoms; both 
diverted and non-diverted groups “improved mental health symptoms over time” (p. 6).  
In addition, both groups had similar arrest rates in the 12-month follow-up (p. 6). The 
overall conclusions of this study suggest that jail diversion programs are effective in 
reducing subjects time spent in jail but that it is unclear whether those diverted actually 
receive the mental health treatment they need.  Even with this shortcoming, TAPA (2004) 
suggests that “jail diversion results in positive outcomes for individuals, systems, and 
communities” (p. 7) because jail diversion “does not increase public safety risk…jail 
diversion programs link divertees to community based services…[and] in general lower 
criminal justice costs” (p. 7). They do however, acknowledge that “the additional 
treatment cost is often higher than the criminal justice savings in the short-run” (p. 7). 
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1.3.2 Arrest Rates 
In their ground breaking work, Teplin & Pruett (1992) found that police 
increasingly arrested individuals with mental illness or acted as street corner psychiatrists 
by informally handling a situation rather than transporting persons to mental health 
facilities.  Police officers often chose arrest or informal measures to control a mental 
health crisis because there were few alternatives available. Teplin (2000) subsequently 
suggested that “while arrest was not a frequent disposition, the arrest rate for persons 
exhibiting signs of mental illness was greater than that of other citizens involved in 
similar types of incidents” (p. 10).  Teplin (2000) argues that the high rate of arrest for 
persons with mental illness was directly related to stringent emergency psychiatric mental 
health codes that require a person be “a danger to self or others” and hospitals hesitation 
to accept “dangerous” patients (p. 10). 
CIT programs were established to increase the facilitation of hospitalization and, 
thereby, reduce arrest.  However, there is conflicting evidence as to whether CIT reduces 
arrest rates for persons in mental health crisis. As discussed under program comparisons 
above, TAPA (2003), suggest diversion programs reduce the amount of time spent in jail.  
However, this study utilized subject self-reports and did not directly compare actual 
arrest rates. 
  In another self-report study, Lattimore et al. (2003) indicate that subjects 
“diverted early in the process by police (i.e., pre-booking) reported fewer arrests and 
were less likely to have been arrested for more serious offenses” (p. 42).  In addition, pre-
booking subjects reported fewer “multiple arrests” in the past 12 months (p. 45).   
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In the 2001 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Bower et al. reported that of the 
3,257 CIT calls in Albuquerque, New Mexico during 1999, police arrested fewer than 10 
percent of the subjects and transported 48 percent of the subjects to local mental health 
facilities (p. 2).  While this statistic appears impressive, the study is limited as there is no 
comparison in arrest rates between CIT and non-CIT officers or between pre-CIT 
implementation and post-CIT implementation; thus, it is not known whether the 
implementation of the CIT program is responsible for the arrest outcomes or if there is 
any difference in the CIT trained officers or non-CIT trained officers call outcomes. In 
addition, Bower reports that 45% of the CIT calls involved suicide attempts or threats (p. 
2). It is difficult to say whether these types of calls are affected by the implementation of 
a CIT program. 
Skeem and Bibeau’s (2008) study of the Las Vegas CIT program found that a 
high percentage of CIT cases (45%) were suicide attempts or threats. They also found 
that subjects were a threat to others in 25% of the cases and that responding officers’ use 
of force was strongly related to officers’ perceptions of subjects’ potential for violence. 
CIT officers appeared conservative in their use of force; however, no comparison on CIT 
training status was available (pp. 202-203).    
According to the Las Vegas study by Skeem and Bibeau, arrest rates in CIT cases 
were low at 4%.  However, they acknowledge the limitation of this finding as there was 
no control group for comparison (pp. 203-204).  In Fisher et al’s (2006) study of arrest 
rates among a statewide mental health cohort, they found that 27.9% of subjects were 
arrested at least once in the 10 year period studied.  Approximately 16% were arrested for 
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a public order offense, with other serious crimes against persons standing at 13.6% (p. 
1625). 
The most statistically rigorous study to date examining CIT call outcomes 
suggests that there are “no significant changes in the rate of arrests by time or training” 
(Teller et al., 2006, p. 232). Teller et al., examined Akron, Ohio police dispatch logs two 
years prior and four years after the implementation of the Akron CIT program. The initial 
analysis of data suggests that CIT trained officers were actually more likely to arrest than 
non-CIT trained officers (p. 236). Teller et al., suggest that dispatchers may be sending 
CIT officers to the most difficult to handle cases where officers may have less discretion 
(p. 236). The significantly higher arrest rate by CIT officers “disappeared after calls 
handled by emergency medical services were excluded from the analysis” (p. 236).  In 
addition, arrest rates might have increased due to the coinciding implementation of the 
Mental Health Court and the CIT program.  Teller et al. suggest that “knowledge of the 
[Mental Health Court] program and the fact that it may help individuals who may 
otherwise be resistant to treatment to live successfully in the community may result in 
CIT trained officers’ choosing arrest in selected cases” (p. 236).  
As noted in this discussion, studies examining arrest rates for mental health crisis 
calls offer conflicting and inconsistent results. In addition, many of the studies have 
serious methodological shortcomings, such as lack of comparison groups. Given the 
limits of and contradictions in the data, it is difficult to make a causal inference regarding 
arrest rates. 
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1.3.3 Police Officer Perspectives 
There are four main articles from 1981 to 1997 that describe the initial research 
on police officer perceptions of persons with mental illness and how those perceptions 
affected officer decision-making.  During their study on police-referred psychiatric 
emergency patients, Sheridan & Teplin (1981) described police as being highly effective 
in “locating and responding” to persons in mental health crisis, while at the same time 
“reassuring…other community members affected by such patients’ behaviors” (p. 146).  
In addition, upon examining officers’ response to, or perception of, the implementation of 
a police reception program at the hospital, officers “showed no resistance to changing 
long-established transportation designations and established rapport quickly with the 
[programs] psychiatric emergency personnel” (Sheridan & Teplin, 1981, p. 146). 
The problem arose, however, that police officers were not trained to identify or 
respond to mental health crisis calls.  In a later study, Teplin (1984) discovered that 
officers often failed at identifying a person as mentally ill (p. 799) and struggled with the 
hospitals stringent requirements for patient admission into the mental health system (p. 
800).  Thus, police officers often made the decision to arrest rather than struggle with the 
mental health system (Teplin, 1984, pp 799-800).  Teplin & Pruett (1992) confirmed this 
finding in their article titled, “Police as Streetcorner Psychiatrists.” They found that 
police had developed “a shared understanding of how things should be done in order to 
manage the mentally disordered citizen” (p. 140). This meant that the probability of an 
officer initiating a mental health detention was small as they were reluctant to deal with 
the “structural constraints governing hospitalization” (p. 140). 
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 Since Teplin & Pruett’s foundational work on police encounters with persons in 
mental health crisis, a small body of research using survey questions and responses to 
vignettes has examined police perceptions of persons in with mental illness and the 
impact of CIT training on those perceptions.  Watson et al. (2004 & 2004) conducted two 
studies using vignettes to examine police officer perceptions of persons in mental health 
crisis. In contradiction to their hypothesis, Watson et al. (2004) found that subjects label 
of mental illness did not significantly affect officers’ responses in situations where an 
arrest may be warranted (p. 383).  This is contradictory to Teplin’s (1984) & Teplin & 
Pruett’s (1992) work where it appeared that persons with mental illness were arrested 
more often. Watson et al. (2004) suggests the discrepancy may lie in officers having less 
discretion in certain cases where arrest may be warranted; thus, it may be that the type of 
offense discussed in the vignette rather than the label of mental illness may have 
instigated the arrest response (p. 383).  In a second, similar study, Watson et al. (2004) 
measured officer perceptions and attitudes about persons described in vignettes.  The 
results of this study indicate that police officers view persons with schizophrenia as being 
less responsible for their situation, more worthy of help, and more dangerous than 
persons for whom no mental illness was provided” (p. 49).   
 In their work on social distance, Bahora et al. (2008) utilized officer responses to 
vignettes on a pre/post CIT training survey. Social distance, in this context, was “a 
measure of social distance estimates one’s comfort level, or how close a person is willing 
to be to someone with a mental illness” (p. 160). Bahora et al. found that there were no 
differences between officers’ scores of social distance for age, race/ethnicity, marital 
status, educational attainment, yearly income, or number of years working as an officer 
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(p. 164). However, scores were “nearly significant” for gender: females tended to have 
lower social distance scores than males (p. 164).  Bahora et al. also found that “social 
distance scores were not associated with personal history of ever having received or 
currently receiving psychiatric treatment, or having a family member or friend in the 
mental health profession” (p. 164).  In contrast, however, they did find that officers who 
had a family member who has received mental health treatment had lower scores on 
social distance (p. 164).  This finding was endorsed in a presentation by Watson (verbal 
communication, CIT conference, Atlanta, 2008) where she reported finding that having a 
family member with mental illness does affect officer’s attitudes toward subjects with 
mental illness.  She suggested that effectiveness as a CIT officer may be enhanced by the 
officer’s having a direct, personal association with a person who has a mental illness. In 
addition, Bahora et al. found that “social distance scores significantly decreased 
following completion of CIT training” (p. 164).  Thus, it appears that CIT training has a 
significant effect on officers’ perceptions of persons with mental illness. 
  Two other studies evaluated officer attitudes towards mental illness pre/post CIT 
training.  Compton (2006) administered a pre/post test to 159 officers before and after 
attending CIT training in Georgia. The results indicate that officer’s attitude toward 
aggressiveness among persons with schizophrenia improved post training, and that 
officer’s demonstrated increased knowledge and decreased social distance about and 
toward persons with schizophrenia (p. 1200). Compton also reports there are no 
significant associations between knowledge of schizophrenia and social distance. 
However, on the pre-test, officers who reported personally knowing a person suffering 
from schizophrenia reported less social distance (p. 1200). 
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As part of a larger study, Ritter (2006) administered a pre/post CIT training 
questionnaire to examine “officers’ perceptions of the [Akron, OH] program 
effectiveness…opinions toward mental illness, and…attitudes toward people with mental 
illness” (p. 4). Ritter found that CIT training affected officer’s understanding of the 
causes of schizophrenia, their perceptions of dangerousness, and their perceived social 
distance from persons with mental illness, which the study found were positively 
associated with perceptions of dangerousness” (p. 7). 
 Borum et al’s (1998) conducted an exploratory survey of Birmingham, Knoxville, 
and Memphis police officer perceptions of program effectiveness.  As discussed earlier in 
this review, Knoxville had a mental-health-specialized response model, Birmingham 
utilized community service officers in a police-based-specialized response model, and 
Memphis utilized the CIT model.  Questionnaires were distributed during roll call at all 
three locations, with a total sample size of 452 officers.  
 Results suggest that police encounters with persons in mental health crisis are 
quite common and pose a significant problem for the police department. However, CIT 
officers in Memphis were significantly more likely than non-CIT officers to feel well 
prepared to handle mental health crisis calls. Memphis CIT officers were also 
significantly more likely than non-CIT officers to express that the linkages between the 
mental health system and police departments were helpful; 71% of Memphis officers, 
regardless of CIT training, rated their departmental CIT program as effective overall.  In 
contrast, slightly over 50% of Knoxville officers rated their specialized-mental-health-
based response program as moderately to very effective and 40% of Birmingham officers 
felt their community-service-based response was moderately to very effective.  As a 
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measure of effectiveness, officers were asked to rate how well the department’s program 
was in keeping mentally ill people out of jail; Memphis officers were significantly more 
likely than Knoxville and Birmingham officers to rate their program as effective.  While 
Memphis police officers felt the program helped to keep people with mental illness out of 
jail, 53.8% of the Memphis officers indicated the CIT program did not help to reduce the 
amount of time patrol officers had to spend on mental health related calls.  Overall, 
Knoxville and Birmingham officers rated their programs as effective in maintaining 
community safety whereas the Memphis CIT program was rated as highly effective in 
this area (Borum et al. 1998, 397-401). 
 In a pre/post test survey, Wells (2006) examined CIT officers’ perceptions of their 
ability to effectively respond to mental health crisis calls. The results suggest that officers 
perceive mental health crisis calls as an “appreciable part of their workload” and that 
repeat calls of this types were a moderate problem (p. 584).  Officers’ perceived mental 
health crisis calls as typically lasting two hours or less, and often involved general order 
maintenance rather than more serious crimes (p. 585). Regarding the disposition of calls, 
a majority of officers were dissatisfied with the options available to them and also report 
dissatisfaction with the mental health/police department linkages for service (p. 586-587). 
Officers indicated that “the process is too time consuming, there is a lack of available 
resources, and there is unwillingness among the service providers to evaluate and treat 
individuals with a mental illness who police contact” (p. 587).   
 Wells also found that CIT training affected officers’ confidence in their ability to 
identify mental illness and to respond appropriately.  Before training, only 10% of the 
officers felt strongly that they could identify a person with mental illness; after training, 
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over one-half thought they could do so.  The pre-training survey results indicate that 64% 
of officers reported that they could not meet the needs of persons in mental health crisis 
compared to 92% post-training.  In addition, prior to training, most officers indicated that 
they did not understand when to use an immediate detention order versus an emergency 
detention order; post-training all but one officer expressed an understanding of the 
differences between the orders and when to use them (p. 590-591). 
 Using focus group methodology, Hanafi et al. (2008) studied recently trained CIT 
officers understanding of mental illness and of how they respond when they encounter it 
in the field.  Overall results indicate that CIT officers expressed an increased knowledge 
of mental illness, improved their ability to respond to mental health crisis calls, reduced 
stigmatization, increased officer empathy, and increased feelings of patience during 
mental health crisis calls.  In addition, there appeared to be a redirection from arrest 
toward hospitalization, and an officer perception of being able to reduce the 
unpredictability of mental health crisis calls (p. 429-431). 
 Compton et al. (2008) examined issues of knowledge retention following CIT 
training. Officers (n=88) who had gone through CIT training the past three years 
completed an online survey.  Compton et al’s results confirmed their hypothesis that 
knowledge retention would decrease significantly in the months following training.  This 
evidence supports the hypothesis that CIT training affects officers’ perceptions of mental 
illness and how they respond to it.  CIT training appears to increase officers’ confidence 
in their ability to recognize signs of mental illness and their understanding of the causes.  
However, there is also evidence that knowledge gained from the training deteriorates 
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over time.  Thus, Compton et al. concluded that officers would benefit from follow-up 
training.  
1.3.4 Research Directions  
Beginning in 1992, Teplin & Pruett proposed that further research on officer 
decision-making processes is needed and that studies should include rural as well as 
urban areas to determine the extent to which there are differences between urban and 
rural management strategies.  Teplin & Pruett (1992) also argued for multi-jurisdictional 
studies to determine the impact of legal structures on police management of the persons 
in mental health crisis (p. 155). 
 More recently, in their examination of the criminalization hypothesis, Engel and 
Silver (2001) argue that it is important to examine the effects of officers’ education, 
attitudes and decision-making processes in mental health crisis calls. In addition, they 
agree with Teplin & Pruett in arguing that different policing organizations may manage 
mental health calls in very different ways; thus further research comparing multiple sites 
and exploring the context of those differences may provide insight into mental health 
crisis call outcomes. Due to the relative rarity of mental health related calls, Engel and 
Silver (2001) recommend that data collection methods should oversample mental health 
calls for service to obtain a large enough sample to be representative of the police 
encounters with the mentally ill (p. 248). 
 Wells’ et al. (2006) argues that “research must continue to measure the effects of 
CIT and other innovative police responses” (p. 596).  Wells purports that in order to 
understand the overall effect of CIT and resulting dispositions, multiple perspectives 
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should be considered, including vantage points of the jails, mental health service 
providers, advocates of the mentally ill and mental health consumers (p. 596). 
 Despite the growing body of literature on officers’ perspectives of mental illness, 
Compton et al. (2008) indicate there is very little evidence-based research on CIT or 
specialized responses to mental health crisis calls.  In their literature review, Compton et 
al. (2008) indicate there were a total of 12 journal articles that specifically addressed CIT 
program outcomes. He suggests that “research is crucial, especially considering CIT is 
uncritically being touted as a model program and being adopted rapidly and broadly” (p. 
53).  Given the paucity of research on CIT, Compton et al. (2008) advocate for both the 
initial and long-term study of all aspects of CIT from patient’s responses to program 
implementation, including for present purposes, especially, factors that strengthen or 
impede the program’s full utilization and potential effectiveness; immediate, 
intermediate, and long-term outcomes for police officers; the manner in which officers 
apply their training in the field; potential benefits of CIT-associated partnerships in terms 
of reform of local mental health systems; attitudinal changes in mental health 
professionals, consumers, and families involved in CIT. 
 In Oliva & Compton’s (2008) descriptive article on the evolution of 
implementation of the Georgia CIT program, they acknowledge the prominent dearth of 
research on CIT to date.  They suggest that research should focus on officer-level 
outcomes rather than on officer attitudes and perceptions.  In addition, patient-level 
outcomes as well as the ways in with CIT programs “stimulate system reform at the local 
level” (p. 44) needs to be evaluated. 
 19 
 
 Bahora et al. (2008) echo many of these suggestions indicating that larger sample 
sizes for officer-level outcomes are necessary.  In addition, Bahora argues that research is 
needed in the areas of mental health crisis call outcomes with respect to number of 
arrests, pathways to mental health services, family-level outcomes and system-level 
outcomes (p. 166). 
 In general, the consensus of scholars studying police interactions with persons in 
mental health crisis needs to shift away from officer attitudes and perceptions of persons 
with mental illness toward evidence-based call outcomes.  In addition, larger sample sizes 
and multi-site comparisons are needed before generalizations may be considered.  
Finally, as little is understood about how CIT is implemented in various jurisdictions and 
if, how, and why, the CIT model is adapted to meet local needs, more in-depth contextual 
analysis of program management, officer-level outcomes, and patient-level outcomes is 
sorely needed. 
1.4 Theoretical Perspective  
 
In the literature on CIT, little attention has been paid to developing theory or a 
conceptual framework within which to examine CIT implementation and functioning. 
Research on CIT, still in its infancy, has focused on officer attitudes towards and 
perceptions of persons suffering from mental illness.  Currently, researchers advocate a 
shift away from this limited focus toward a larger focus on the context of CIT and 
resulting outcomes.  In two separate articles, Watson et al. (2008) and Morabito (2007) 
provide a base conceptualization of how research might move in this direction. 
Watson et al. (2008) provide a conceptual framework to analyze the “broader 
contextual forces that may shape implementation and outcomes” (p. 362) of police 
response to persons in mental health crisis. They provide a multi-level conceptualization 
 20 
 
of an organizational model which connects contextual factors of crisis intervention to 
police intervention outcomes. The main components of the model (see Figure 1.1) 
include officer characteristics, officer's CIT training status, availability and perceptions of 
community treatment linkages, organizational factors including saturation and 
champions, community characteristics including social disorganization and crime rates, 
and resulting encounter outcomes (Watson et al., 2008, p. 363).  They suggest that all of 
these factors play a large role in determining the effectiveness of a CIT program. 
             
Figure 1.1 Conceptualization of effectiveness of CIT (reproduced from Watson et al (2008), p. 363)
 
             
 
Watson et al. (2008) argue there may be specific officer characteristics that 
enhance crisis intervention outcomes. Of possible import are officer demographics, prior 
training, familiarity with mental illness and completion of CIT training (p. 363). Also 
important to the model is the level of CIT trained officer saturation (defined as the 
optimal number of CIT trained officers) in the department. It is hypothesized in the 
literature that 15 to 25% of the police departments officers be CIT trained; however, this 
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saturation level has yet to be empirically substantiated (Watson et al., 2008, p. 364).  In 
conjunction with the saturation level, Watson et al. argue that a key element in the 
implementation of a new CIT programs is the presence of a champion. A champion of the 
program may aid in motivating officers to participate in the program and see value in the 
training and response alternatives (p. 364).  
Watson et al’s model of program effectiveness also identifies the importance of 
cooperative linkages between the police department, medical and psychiatric treatment 
facilities, and community members.  They suggest that the availability of alternatives to 
arrest (i.e. transport to a hospital) and the officer’s perception of the viability of these 
alternatives will impact the officer’s decision-making process during encounters 
involving persons in mental health crisis (p. 364-365).  Other research confirms the 
import of officer’s perceptions of the organizational linkages and the effectiveness with 
which these linkages function (Laberge & Morin, 1995; Morabito, 2007; Rogers, 1990; 
Watson et al., 2008).  According to Laberge & Morin’s (1995) summary of available 
research, officers’ decisions to engage alternative options to arrest are highly affected by 
the efficiency and effectiveness of those alternatives.  For instance, an officer’s decision 
to arrest rather than instigate a treatment outcome may be affected by irritants including 
long waiting periods at the hospital, complicated admissions procedures, questioning of 
officers’ judgment by medical staff, refusal of referrals, and ineffective treatment 
outcomes resulting in a ‘revolving door’ in and out of the treatment facility (p. 402).  
Rogers (1990) reported a similar problem indicating that officers receive very little 
organizational back-up.  The Memphis Model of CIT is designed to promote cooperative 
linkages between treatment facilities and police departments and to address the problems 
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that officers face when attempting to instigate alternative options to arrest.  While CIT 
program proponents have asserted that the CIT program strengthens organizational 
linkages and reduces officer irritants, no empirical study of the effect of these linkages on 
encounter outcomes has been conducted to date.   
Morabito (2007) provides another conceptual framework that may be applicable 
to examining CIT. Morabito (2007) argues that Egon Bittner’s (1967) framework of 
“horizons of context” may be useful in evaluating the decision-making process of police 
in crisis intervention encounters and the effect of the CIT program on those decisions 
(Morabito, 2007, pp. 1583-1585).  The “horizon of context” framework consists of three 
parts: the scenic horizon, the temporal horizon, and the manipulative horizon.   
The scenic horizon suggests that there may be a normal baseline of deviance that 
a community is willing to tolerate; this baseline of acceptable deviance will vary by 
community.  In the context of encounters with persons with mental illness, a community 
may tolerate a certain amount of ‘deviant’ behavior before considering it to be a problem 
warranting police or medical intervention. The definition of what situation warrants 
intervention may be shaped by community and police and medical organizations.  
Morabito (2007) states that decisions to intervene in a situation are often shaped through 
community preferences (p. 1584) and may be heavily influenced by organizational 
linkages to services.  Morabito (2007) describes the issues related to organizational 
linkages similarly to Watson et al. (2008) in that officers’ perceptions of those linkages 
are important to their function and effectiveness.  This suggests that the contexts in which 
police officers encounter mentally ill persons may be important to responses. 
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The second component of the theoretical framework is the temporal horizon.  This 
horizon includes factors such as the officers’ demographics, officers’ inclination toward 
empathy versus cynicism, and the subjects’ demographic and geographic characteristics.  
Similar to Watson et al’s (2008) model, Morabito (2007) contends that the officers’ age, 
gender, education and experience may affect whether they empathize with persons 
suffering from mental illness and may thus be more likely to accept alternative methods 
of responding to mental health crisis calls.  In contrast, officer characteristics may sway 
attitudes toward cynicism where the officer may not empathize and may see little 
advantage in the available alternatives.  In addition to the officers’ demographics, the 
subjects’ demographics may affect officer decision-making; officers’ decisions may be 
affected by the subject’s age, appearance, or knowledge of failed prior treatment. 
The third component of the theoretical framework is the manipulative horizon.  
This horizon includes concern for community safety and elements of the mental health 
crisis call, including the severity of the situation and the subject’s immediate behavior.  
Morabito (2007) suggests that officer decision-making options may be severely restricted 
due to the severity of the crime committed or the immediate or immanent violent 
behavior of the subject.  Other variables in the manipulative horizon that may come into 
play are the officers concerns over time and efficiency with which the call may be 
completed and whether alternative resources are available to solve the current crisis. 
Watson et al’s (2008) and Morabito’s (2007) conceptual frameworks include remarkably 
similar characteristics, except in one area.  Morabito’s framework includes factors related 
to the crisis call; for instance, the manipulative horizon takes into consideration the 
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severity of the call, safety of the community, and the subject’s behavioral characteristics.  
In Watson et al’s model, the influence of mental health crisis call characteristics is absent. 
Combining Watson et al’s model and Morabito’s crisis call characteristics 
provides a power conceptual model for analysis (see Fig. 1.2). The adoption of this 
overall framework of analysis will provide a “powerful basis from which to explore 
police response to people with mental illness” (Morabito, 2007, p. 1586), the effects of 
the CIT program, and the community and organizational context in which the program 
was implemented and managed. 
             
Figure 1.2 Conceptualization of CIT with addition of influence of Crisis Call Characteristics 
 
             
 
1.5 Summary 
 
While the Memphis Model of CIT training was established over 20 years ago, 
there is very little research establishing whether the program is effective in meeting its 
goals and objectives.  Anecdotal evidence and limited research suggests that CIT training 
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is effective in (1) reducing arrests, (2) reducing injuries to both officers and subjects, and 
(3) increasing the utilization of immediate detentions in a hospital.  Much of the research 
supporting these claims lacks control groups, comparisons between CIT and non-CIT 
trained officers, or pre/post CIT implementation.  Therefore, the claims made about CIT 
program effectiveness have yet to be fully tested. 
According to the research on program comparisons, the Memphis Model appears 
to be more effective than other programs or response strategies in facilitating mental 
health treatment alternatives to jail. However, research suggests that disparate response 
strategies, such as pre- and post-booking programs intending to diverting subjects with 
mental illness from jail to a hospital target different populations. While CIT clearly 
targets the population of persons with mental illness, it is unclear whether CIT targets 
cases that would have resulted in arrest or hospitalization regardless of whether the 
officer received the specialized training.  It is possible that CIT may predominantly target 
cases where arrest would not be the primary response, for example, cases of suicide 
attempts or threats.  Thus, it is unclear whether the Memphis Model of CIT or other 
adapted models change the way in which officers resolve cases through arrest or mental 
health alternatives. 
There is conflicting evidence on whether the CIT program is effective in reducing 
arrests and subsequently increasing the use of mental health alternatives.  The 
Albuquerque, New Mexico study indicated that fewer than 10% of cases resulted in 
arrest. The Las Vegas, Nevada study reported that 4% of subjects were arrested. The 
Akron, Ohio study suggests that CIT officers might actually arrest subjects more often 
than non-CIT trained officers.  Given the limited and conflicting evidence on arrest rates, 
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it is challenging to state with confidence that CIT is actually the cause of these low arrest 
rates.  As noted above, there are no comparisons between CIT and non-CIT trained 
officers’ responses, and there is potential that CIT calls in general would not typically 
result in arrest regardless of the officers CIT training status. 
Officers’ perceptions of mental illness have been the focus of most of the research 
on CIT.   The predominate methodology utilized in research on officers’ perceptions of 
mental illness includes the use of officer training surveys, officer responses to vignettes 
and officer survey data.  These methodologies, while producing informative results, are 
limited in that they examine hypothetical events and potentially biased self-report data. 
One of the goals of the CIT program is to increase officers’ abilities to recognize 
mental illness.  There are conflicting reports regarding whether a label of mental illness 
affects an officers response. A 2004 study suggests the label of mental illness does not 
affect officers’ responses; two other studies contradict this report suggesting that the label 
does matter, especially the label of schizophrenia and its effect on perceptions of 
dangerousness.  Limited research suggests that CIT may strengthen officers’ ability to 
recognize mental illness, but it is unclear if, and how, effective CIT training is in 
increasing recognition due to the lack of significant research utilizing control or 
comparison groups. 
The paucity of research, the conflicting results of available reports, and the use of 
non-quasi-experimental data does not provide substantial support for the anecdotal claims 
of CIT program effectiveness.  Research needs to shift away from vignettes and survey 
methodology towards quasi-experimental research with control or comparison groups. In 
addition there is need for contextual analysis of CIT programs to examine various CIT 
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models including if, and how, they are adapted to meet local needs, and, subsequently, 
affect officers’ responses to and resolutions of mental health crisis calls. 
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1.6 Research Questions 
 
This study provides an intensive case study of the Bloomington Indiana Police 
Department’s CIT program and the community context in which this program functions. 
The first part of this case study examined the CIT implementation process and 
subsequent management of the program.  The second part of this case study analyzed 
data from officer-completed incident response sheets to examine the effects of CIT 
training on mental health crisis calls. This two part study addresses the following main 
questions: 
 
● What was the program implementation process; how, why and by whom was 
the CIT program adapted to address specific community needs? 
 
● What community and organizational linkages arose due to the implementation 
of CIT and how are these linkages perceived by stakeholders. 
 
● Does CIT training affect how officers respond to and resolve incidents  
involving persons in mental health crisis? Are there differences between CIT 
and non-CIT trained officers? 
 
Utilizing interviews and focus groups this research focuses on conceptualizing 
and analyzing the broader contextual forces in which the Bloomington CIT program 
functions. In addition, the study examines the effect of CIT training on crisis call 
outcomes.   
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Chapter 2: CIT Implementation 
 
2.1 Research Setting 
 
Bloomington, located in the county seat of Monroe County, sits in the southern 
region of Indiana.  The city of Bloomington was established in 1818 with approximately 
30 families settling the area.  Shortly after, in 1824, a state seminary opened, with an 
enrollment of 10.  This seminary subsequently transformed into Indiana University, 
which currently has enrollment levels just over 40,000. The college town environment 
brings diverse art and culture to the city. The Jacob School of Music holds the Opera 
Theatre and public performances numbering over 1000 each year.  The Buskirk-Chumley 
Theater is a community theater which holds over 200 public performances each year. In 
addition, Bloomington is known for the Lotus festival of World Music which draws 
musical artists from around the world.  Bloomington is also the home of the Ganden 
Dehling Buddhist Temple. 
In addition to the establishment of the seminary, early growth in the area was 
spurred by the arrival of the New Albany and Salem railroad in 1854.  The arrival of the 
railroad brought commercial establishments such as hotels, an iron foundry and 
cabinetmakers.  Bloomington was also a way station on the Underground Railroad during 
the Civil War.  By 1900, Bloomington was home to prosperous industry including a 
limestone quarry.  The Sanders Quarry is famous for its high quality limestone and has 
been used in buildings such as the Empire State Building, The Pentagon, and was used 
extensively in Chicago’s rebuilding after the Great Chicago Fire.  This quarry reached 
popular fame from the 1979 film Breaking Away where the main character and his friends 
swam in the local quarry.  Today, Bloomington has a strong industrial presence with 
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major employers such as Baxter BioPharma Solutions, Cook Group Incorporated, 
General Electric, Hoosier Energy, and Otis Elevator (see Bloomington Tourism Center). 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the population in Bloomington in 2000 was 
69,291. The racial makeup of the city was 87% white, 4.2% black, 5.3% Asian, 2.5% 
Latino or Hispanic, and 1% other.  Of those 25 year or older, 16.3% are high school 
graduates, and 54.8% have a Bachelor’s degree or higher.  The per capita income (1999) 
was $16,481, with 29.6% persons below the poverty line.  
According to an online article, titled History of BPD by Officer Lloyd Hawkins, 
the Bloomington Police Department (BPD) was established in 1899. Beginning in 1910, 
BPD police officers wore uniforms for the first time and the current officer badge still 
resembles the original 1910 badge. The BPD purchased its first police vehicle in 1916 
and its first motorcycle in 1922. From 1958 to 1973 the BPD was responsible for the 
ambulance service.  Police officers, while not trained as medics, operated the ambulances 
until the service was taken over by the Bloomington Fire Department.  In 1987, the BPD 
established its first organized field training program.   
Currently, the BPD employs 92 sworn officers and 36 civilian employees.  BPD 
has a Critical Incident Team, which handles hostage and emergency situations, a K-9 
unit, and participates in a multi-jurisdictional Dive Team.  BPD also cooperates with the 
Indiana University Police Department and the Monroe County Sheriff.   
In 2005, the Monroe County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council began 
investigating CIT training and whether the program might benefit the police and 
community.  The BPD agreed to implement the CIT program, established a CIT 
committee, and had the Field Training Officer conduct the first CIT training session in 
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June 2006.  Approximately 53% of the BPD police force received CIT training as of 
April 2009.  In addition, dispatchers, emergency first responders, and officers from 
surrounding cities, such as Ellettsville, have attended BPD CIT training sessions. Indiana 
University Police and the Monroe County Sheriff’s departments were invited to 
participate in training but declined.  
The Captain of the BPD and members of the CIT committee decided that a 
research agenda was important to the implementation process. This chapter focuses on 
the implementation of CIT in Bloomington and examines the wider community context 
within which the program functions and is further managed. 
2.2 Methodology 
 
 The following description and analysis of the process of implementing the CIT 
program draws on interviews and focus groups between June and August 2009. 
Information from the interviews and focus groups was subsequently organized, coded, 
and analyzed with NVivo 8 (a qualitative software program). The purpose of this analysis 
was to provide a description of the CIT implementation process and to examine the 
community context in which the program was established and now functions. 
 Everyone who could be identified as having taken part in the initiation, planning, 
and subsequent implementation of CIT training was interviewed.  These stakeholders 
included the BPD Police Chief, the BPD CIT Coordinator, members of the BPD CIT 
Committee (which include representatives of the National Alliance on Mental Illness 
(NAMI)), Bloomington Hospital administrators and physicians, Center for Behavioral 
Health representatives, members of the Monroe County Criminal Justice Coordinating 
Council, and police administrators.  The purpose of these interviews was to gain insight 
into the stakeholders’ opinions about the CIT implementation process.   
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I conducted the interviews face-to-face with the stakeholders at a location of the 
stakeholder’s choosing.  Four interviews were conducted in private conference rooms or 
offices at the police station, one was conducted at a local Starbucks, one was conducted 
at a local deli and the remainder (4) where conducted in the interviewees’ private offices.  
The interviews were semi-structured utilizing an interview schedule.  The interview 
schedule was predominately followed during the interview; however, the method did 
allow for deviation from the scheduled topics allowing for natural conversation between 
the interviewee and myself (see interview schedule included in appendix B). 
 Focus group subjects (police officers who had completed the BPD CIT training) 
were contacted via a verbal request by the BPD CIT coordinator.   The coordinator asked 
eight CIT trained officers to participate in each session.  Eight officers (two female and 
six male officers) participated in the first focus group.  For session two, five officers 
agreed to participate; all the participating officers in this group were males.  The focus 
groups were held in a private conference room at the BPD headquarters on June 6 and 
June 11, 2009. The BPD CIT coordinator and other BPD administrators were not present 
during the focus groups.   
 In theory, the focus groups were designed to allow officers to converse on topics 
they found pertinent and to allow their conversation to transpire with little interjection on 
my part, though if there was a lull in conversation, I had at my disposal a schedule of 
questions to get the conversation rolling again. In practice, conversations did not flow 
naturally.  Rather than a fluid conversation between participants, the officers relied on me 
asking questions and then their providing a response, with limited conversation between 
the participants.  This was especially true for session two, where the atmosphere was 
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rather hostile, as the officers appeared rather unhappy about participating. Thus, session 
two followed the schedule of questions almost exclusively.  Participants in session one 
conversed among themselves more so than did the session two participants; thus, session 
one was more “spur of the moment,” resulting in conversation of interest to the officers 
and providing contextual information that was not prompted by my questions.   
In addition to the focus groups and interviews, I reviewed the CIT training 
materials and sat in on training sessions.  Reviewing and analyzing the training program 
helped me place comments from the focus groups and interviews in context.  Moreover, 
the training evaluation allowed me to document how the BPD’s training differed from the 
Memphis Model and provided contextual information about BPD’s decision to deviate. 
2.3 Implementation 
 
In order to explore the context within which the CIT program was implemented, I 
was interested in why stakeholders thought a CIT program was necessary to begin with.  
Thus, the first question posed to the focus groups and the interviewees was “Prior to the 
implementation of the CIT program, what was the main problem you think the police 
department faced when dealing with mental health crisis calls?”  In response, police 
administrators said that they did not think that BPD had many problems with the way 
officers responded to calls. As one interviewee responded, “I’m not sure we necessarily 
had a lot of problems.  Our officers did get some training prior to CIT on mental illness 
and how they were supposed to react and respond.”  Although police administrators did 
not believe that officers’ responses were a problem, they did believe that the Department 
had a communication problem.  The main problem they believed they faced, and the main 
reason that they decided to implement the CIT program, was that they believed that 
community members did not understand what police officers ‘do’ or how they typically 
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handle mental health crisis calls.  This misperception, in their view, resulted in 
community criticism and political pressure for the police department to ‘do something’. 
One police administrator explained,  
What got us into CIT were outside forces pushing that we get CIT training. Our 
department trains more than any other law enforcement department in the county. 
We had protocols and policies in place already on how to respond to people with 
mental illnesses. But, because we are the largest [policing agency in the area] thats 
where the [community and political] focus shifted to.  They [the Monroe County 
Criminal Justice Coordinating Council] wanted us to do it and there was a lot of 
pressure. We maintained for a long time that we had already trained in this and that 
we didn't have a problem. 
 
 Latent dissatisfaction coalesced into vocal criticism with an incident that occurred 
on November 6, 2003, when a mentally ill man was arrested, taken to jail, and then 
Tasered during an altercation at the time of booking.  The man, who had a heart 
condition, died.  According to police administrators, some members of the community 
raised the question of why the man had been taken to jail instead of the hospital 
(stakeholder interview). 
 As this incident brought issues of mental health and criminal justice to the 
forefront of political concern, members of the Monroe County Criminal Justice 
Coordinating Council and other community stakeholders, including the prosecutor’s 
office, started investigating what one stakeholder described as “the problem of police 
intervention.”  This scrutiny revealed the second problem that BPD faced, that is, 
according to police administrators, when dealing with mental health crisis calls, not all 
agencies were working together or operating “on the same page,” when it came to mental 
health crisis calls.  Police administrators identified one of their main problems was the 
lack of cooperation by Bloomington Hospital, the only local hospital with emergency 
services for psychiatric cases.  This lack of cooperation was later identified as resulting 
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from a lack of communication between BPD and hospital administrators and a lack of 
agreement on policies and procedures for officers bringing subjects to the hospital. 
 Officers in the focus groups identified the hospitals lack of cooperation as their 
main problem in dealing with mental health crisis calls.  One officer stated, “The main 
problem I faced is the lack of the hospitals cooperation in taking subjects and, when they 
did accept them, I’d have to wait five or six hours for an evaluation to be done.”  Many of 
the officers echoed that they had experienced similar long waiting periods and also 
encountered negative attitudes from physicians.   
 From police administrators’ point of view, the hospital was a large problem for 
the Department because there was no policy or procedure in place for officers to instigate 
an immediate detention, also called a 24 hour hold.  In addition, the hospital did not have 
dedicated rooms in the emergency department where an officer could take a subject for 
evaluation; nor were there security measures in place at the hospital to handle these kinds 
of situations.  The lack of dedicated space and hospital security resulted in officers 
waiting for long periods in the emergency room before the subject was evaluated by a 
physician.  Hospital administrators confirmed that “the hospital’s policy was that if an 
officer brought in a subject for evaluation the officer must stay with the subject for 
security purposes.”  
 Officers also indicated that they were often reluctant to take a subject to the 
hospital because they felt the hospital would not admit the subject to the psychiatric 
ward; rather, officers perceived that the hospital would evaluate the subject and 
immediately release them.   Thus, officers in the focus group unanimously agreed that 
they would often be called back the same night to deal with the same subject.  They 
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expressed their frustration over the lack of physicians’ willingness to accept and admit 
subjects they thought were in need of medical or psychiatric help. 
 One mental health advocate stated that “discovering all of these things galvanized 
the community and gave an opportunity for family members to express their discontent 
with the police and the hospital.”  She stated that these issues were not new, but there was 
no forum in which community members could express the problems they were having.  
Thus, “when the man was Tasered and died, we were afforded an opportunity to voice 
our concerns to persons in authority who might actually be able to do something about 
it.”  She went on to say that she knew many people in the community who felt concerned 
about “the lack of care that we have for individuals with mental illness” and that she 
knows many people that have had “run-ins with the police.”  This advocate shared her 
personal experience saying, “In fact, I have a brother who is schizophrenic, and I know 
how difficult it is to communicate with the police.” She expressed that she was frustrated 
that officers would not utilize 24 hour holds as a mechanism of getting subjects into the 
hospital.  After discussions with police administrators during CIT implementation 
meetings, she realized that the problem in getting people treated was really a problem 
with the hospital. 
Another mental health advocate agreed, stating that the main problem the police 
department faced was a poor relationship with the hospital.  She stated, “I think the 
hospital is the weak link.  Not having someone come down and do an assessment quickly 
enough so that officers cannot be back on the beat I think is totally ridiculous.” This 
advocate was very vociferous and adamant that the problem was not with the police, but 
with the hospital.  She went on to say,  
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The hospital is totally resistant.  They are resistant to quality treatment of the 
psychiatric population.  And, I think the people in charge at the hospital should be 
fired and move on.  I believe that firmly.  I have said it to their faces, and I would 
say it again to their faces.  It is irresponsible that the hospital is the weak link. 
 
Another third mental health advocate echoed this sentiment stating, “It behooves us as a 
community to try and monitor what’s happening in our institutions and demand the best.” 
As these issues galvanized several members of the Monroe County Justice 
Coordinating Council and other community mental health advocates traveled to Fort 
Wayne, Indiana to examine the Fort Wayne CIT program in hopes that it might offer a 
solution to this community problem.  One advocate described,  
We drove with some of the Fort Wayne officers to get their perspective on how 
things were working up there.  We also went to a clubhouse, like a hanging out 
place for kids.  They said that the way the police did things that it was very seldom 
that someone would end up in jail, especially those who would have been better 
placed in the hospital. It made a lot of sense, you know, because we don’t want 
things to escalate.  So, we came back here [Bloomington] and created a little task 
force, which I served on, and then got the police and others involved with bringing 
CIT to our community. [Once the task force was formed] we met for quite awhile, 
ending gradually, and I think rightfully so, with the police taking over and 
implementing the CIT program. 
 
As the BPD began the implementation process, police and hospital administrators, 
reached an impasse with the hospitals refusing to conduct 24 hour holds when requested 
by police officers and their refusal to change hospital security policies with respect to 
officers bringing subjects in for evaluation.  A mental health advocate and member of the 
CIT committee described the impasse stating,  
We just couldn’t figure out a way. The hospital was resistant because they thought 
they would become the de facto dumping ground for anyone the police didn’t want 
to deal with.  So, we had an unusual situation where everyone but the hospital agreed 
that CIT would be good for our community, that we wanted police to receive this 
training and we wanted to try and improve the way mentally ill persons were treated 
in our community—but we would have to do it without the cooperation of the 
hospital. 
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One hospital administrator countered that,  
The only component that the hospital had been resistant to was that they had 
concerns about security.  There were concerns that if an individual was brought in 
to the emergency room and the law enforcement officer left immediately and they 
became the hospital’s security issue, what do we do if this guy checks out ok?  If 
that person does not meet the legal criteria to be admitted, and it was really more of 
a criminal matter, then what?  So, there were some discussions at that point between 
law enforcement, behavioral health professionals, and hospital security. 
 
 This administrator went on to say that, 
Many of our concerns were internal to the hospital process.  Some individuals 
thought that if there was a psychiatric issue the officer should bring the subject 
directly to the [psychiatric ward] and bypass the emergency room altogether.  
Others were against this saying that the first response should be a medical 
evaluation as well as a psychiatric evaluation so the emergency room was the 
appropriate place for officers to bring subjects.  So, you see, there were internal 
things going on that community members did not know about and it then appeared 
as if the hospital was resisting the CIT program.  It is my opinion that when the 
whole process began there was not an adversarial relationship between the hospital 
and the police department.  There just had to be a lot of changes and that takes 
time.  I can see where there were adversarial overtones to it, but we needed to work 
through what was going to work for us as well as what was going to work for the 
police. 
 
In addition to the tension between the hospital and the police department, there 
was community contention about BPD’s choice to adapt the Memphis Model of CIT 
training.  Police administrators felt that there “was a lot of fluff” in the Memphis Model 
training and that it would not fit the needs of the community.  The Memphis Model of 
CIT training was designed for a large city, with multiple hospitals and other service 
organizations.  Police administrators decided that while the Memphis Model might be 
working in Fort Wayne, there was little evidence to suggest that their training program 
was really any better than other training strategy.  The CIT committee examined several 
different departments’ training programs, which claimed to follow the Memphis Model of 
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training, but found that all were different and had been adapted to meet the needs of the 
individual police department and community.  
 As the literature review indicates, there is no standard Memphis Model CIT 
training. Moreover, there is little research to support the claim that the Memphis Model is 
effective in reaching its goals and objectives.  Dupont, Cochran, and Pillsbury (2007) 
published a web document that outlines the core elements of the Memphis program, but 
includes little about specific content.  Even this outline, however, was not published until 
a year and a half after Bloomington implemented its CIT training.  Thus, many programs 
that purport to follow the Memphis Model may be adopting the core elements but filling 
in the blanks to fit the needs of the local community just as the BPD decided to do.   
Nonetheless, community mental health advocates were concerned about BPD’s 
decision to deviate from Fort Wayne’s model of training. This concern arose, in part, 
because Fort Wayne’s training claimed to be fully faithful to the Memphis Model and 
local mental health advocates touted Fort Wayne as the exemplary city.  Instead, BPD’s 
administrators chose to incorporate what they thought were the essential elements of the 
Memphis training model, but made changes with respect to hospital site visits for 
officers, role-playing during the training, and who among officers should be trained.  In 
adapting the training from Fort Wayne, the BPD administrators decided to eliminate the 
site visits to the hospital.  They made this change because there was only one hospital, 
which was not cooperating, and because all of the officers were familiar already with the 
hospital; thus, they saw no need to waste a full day of training.   
The second area in which the BPD deviated from the Memphis Model was in 
replacing the role-playing exercises with contact exercises.  In the Fort Wayne training, 
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officers were asked to role-pay encounters with hypothetical characters who were 
mentally ill and in crisis.  The contact exercises that replaced role-playing consisted of 
small group discussions in which officers would read a scenario and then, as a group, 
decide the best way to approach the situation and how to best incorporate some of the 
new tools they had learned in the training.  The exercise was similar to role-playing, 
except for the actual re-enactment of the scene in front of fellow trainees.   
Most of the officers in the focus groups said they were thankful that they did not 
have to conduct role-playing exercises and felt the contact exercises accomplished the 
same goal, although these sentiments were not universal. One officer stated, “I think role-
playing exercises would have been a better application.  I think we did not get enough 
time to practice the new tools we had learned.  I would have liked a little more 
application of the ideas.”  A few other officers chimed in that, if they were rookies, then 
role-playing may have been beneficial.  However, because most of them were veterans, 
they felt that role-playing would have been a waste of time because they had already 
experienced so much of the “real thing on real crisis calls.”  The consensus was expressed 
by one officer’s rolling his eyes and stating, “I don’t want to do role-playing. It is not 
beneficial.” 
As time passed, many of the concerns about BPD’s adaptations in training content 
evaporated.  Many mental health advocates and members of the Monroe County Criminal 
Justice Coordinating Council stated they were no longer concerned about BPD’s 
adaptations of CIT training once they saw that police officers were open to the idea of 
learning more about how to handle mental health crisis calls.  One interviewee discussed 
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a case that happed before the implementation of CIT, where she had been reluctant to call 
police.  In this case, a woman was  
[V]ery, very paranoid and by herself in her home.  She barred the door and would 
not let anyone in.  When the police arrived they would just do this series of 
escalating actions that would make her more paranoid and become more and more 
resistant.  However, after CIT, we can now feel more confident that officers are not 
going to escalate the situation and will have a treatment outcome as the primary 
goal.  
 
Most of the interviewees agreed that the BPD had made appropriate changes to 
the training program.  By the time of the interviews, three years after the implementation 
of CIT, most felt that adapting the program had been good idea.  One police administrator 
likened the idea of adapting the CIT program to progress made on automobiles.  He 
stated,  
I don't see a problem with that at all. As a matter of fact, I think the parallel that I 
would draw to this is that anything that was developed and made it has a lot of work 
that goes into it to get it up and running. We should always look at improving it. 
The parallel that I'll run is with the automobile. How far would we be behind if we 
were still operating vehicles that were made a decade ago? Clearly somebody saw a 
need, and saw that some of the changes were needed and were really great. So let's 
keep the ball rolling.  Let's improve on it.  Let’s continue to make it better. I think 
we should always, always try to make it better. I don't think anyone should be put 
off that we looked at the Memphis Model and said, ‘Hey, this is a great thing but 
let's improve upon it.’ 
 
In addition to the changes made in CIT training content, BPD decided to train all 
of their officers, rather than a few volunteer officers. A police administrator explained,  
I said look, I understand that the goal of the Memphis Model is to get officers who 
want to do it. So, my argument to people is that if I had a whole department that 
didn't want to do it [take the training] should we not do it? So we had officers that 
did not want to go the this training, but we did make them go through the training. 
Those officers responded that they didn’t want to do it, but did find that the training 
was really good. It's like anything. You can think of anything you don't like to do 
but there are certain things you just have to do. An officer cannot pick and choose 
the calls they get. If we train them all, they may not like it, they may not like to do 
it, but they have to. At least they have that training so that they can recognize the 
signs; they'll be able to communicate and they might know something about 
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medication; they might know what resources are available. So it just boggles my 
mind that there are people that would not want police officers to get this training. 
And we did [train everyone], we took a lot of heat over that point. It became a hot 
political issue. The activists made it very public. The Mayor, it was very nice, we 
had the Mayor's total support for what we thought would be best for the department. 
He was even surprised that there were people that were critical of us that we would 
train everyone. That just doesn't make any sense. And really, that's such a huge 
impact on resources for us to do that. But, it's important enough because you just 
never know when you might encounter someone that's in the middle of a crisis. 
 
While some community activists still believe that in order to have a “true CIT 
model, you can only train volunteer, veteran officers,” most mental health advocates and 
mental health professionals now applaud BPD for expending the resources to train all 
officers.  Indeed, having trained all BPD officers has, in the eyes of one advocate 
highlighted another problem:  BPD is the only policing agency in the area to complete 
CIT training.  The Monroe County Sheriff and the Indiana University Campus Police 
Department have not participated in CIT training.  Although these agencies were invited 
to participate in the BPD training, they declined the invitation.  The advocate stated that 
because of the success of BPD in training almost all of its officers “we are now telling 
everybody that if you’ve got a problem you should call 911 and ask for a CIT officer.”  
But because only city police are receiving this training people are calling in from the 
county or to campus police, asking for a CIT officer to come, and being told from the 
dispatcher that they have no idea what CIT is or what the caller is talking about.  The 
advocate stated,  
The reality is that it’s [the possibility of getting a CIT officer] only true for people 
in the city and not for people in the county.  It’s a problem because people are not 
aware of this and it’s causing a lot of confusion.  So, there is a major 
communication and linkage problem. 
 
While this linkage problem has yet to be solved, both the focus group members 
and the interviewees talked about other institutional linkages  The discussions focused on 
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the successful linkages made between the police department, the hospital, and other 
community service agencies.  The consensus was that CIT was directly responsible for 
establishing communication between institutions, for establishing effective processes that 
involved multiple agencies, and for changing stakeholder attitudes from negative to 
positive. 
The most important linkage that CIT established was with the hospital.  Prior to 
and during the early stages of implementation, the police saw the hospital as 
uncooperative.  However, as time has passed, communication between police and 
hospital administrators improved and policies and processes acceptable to both agencies 
were implemented. For instance, one of the early contentions was that the hospital would 
not accept officers bringing in subjects for a 24 hour hold.  According to Indiana Statute 
IC12-26-4, law enforcement officers have the authority to transport an individual with a 
mental illness who is considered dangerous and in need of immediate hospitalization and 
treatment to a medical facility where the person may be detained for up to 24 hours for 
medical evaluation. Police administrators brought this statute to hospital administrators’ 
attention, and then worked with them to establish effective processes for accommodating 
officers’ legal authority to bring subjects to the hospital.    
Hospital administrators acknowledged their resistance to the immediate detention 
policy was that it was an internal security problem for them.  At the time of BPD’s 
implementation, the hospital had not worked out its internal processes for where police 
should bring subjects (the psychiatric ward or the emergency room) and had not 
completed discussions with hospital security on this issue.  In addition, there was concern 
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over issues of paperwork and what legal information was needed to complete a 24 hour 
hold.   
At the time of the interviews, three years after implementation, it appeared that 
these problems had been worked out.  The hospital now has a separate designated room 
that they call the “quiet room,” where officers can bring subjects in for evaluation.  The 
agreement between BPD and the hospital is that police officers are required to stay for 15 
minutes; emergency room physicians have 15 minutes to respond to the quite room to 
conduct an evaluation and make a determination if the subject will be admitted.  If an 
emergency room physician cannot respond within 15 minutes, hospital security is 
suppose to take over allowing the police officer to return to their duties on the street. 
Officers in the focus groups indicate that the process of immediate detentions at 
the hospital has been an extremely useful tool and the process has been effective.  
Officers indicated that rather than spending 5-6 hours in the emergency room “baby-
sitting” they can now get out of the hospital in one hour or less—including time to 
complete all the paperwork.  
Officers also indicated that the attitudes of physicians have improved. One officer 
described the improvement saying,  
There is definite improvement in the way the hospital is in that it has led to a 
different attitude for physicians and officers. I know before the attitude of 
physicians was definitely, if you can take them to jail do that and for God's sake 
don't bring them to the hospital. But now, because of the hospital change, that 
whole attitude has changed. Now it's not the black hole that you never come back 
out again. It's like my case for example, I'm thinking along the lines of okay, I can 
talk to the doctor here now, and he can say, let's do this, let's do that. I might not 
have thought that way several years ago. So, I think if nothing else CIT has changed 
a lot of attitudes about the way we deal with people. I don't think the jail first 
attitude is necessarily there any more as it might have been at one time. You know, 
in the past, the jail was 15 minutes and you are back out on the street and the 
hospital was three or four hours. So, you know, which one would anyone choose?  
 45 
 
Because of CIT, the choice is now clearly to go to the hospital because you can get 
in and out quickly and with better responses from the physicians and staff. 
 
Hospital administrators agreed that the mechanisms in place for communicating 
with the police department and for handling subjects that officers bring in has greatly 
improved due to the CIT program.  One hospital administrator explained,  
We know we can communicate with the police through the Monroe County 
Criminal Justice Coordinating Council meeting every other month.  And, police 
administrators know they can call any time if they have an issue.  In a lot of ways, 
the process has been streamlined for everyone.  I think that the difference is that 
when field officers haven’t received any training, I think it hinders the assessment 
because of the language, the lingo; those officers who have been through the 
training…the communication between them and the emergency room staff  seems 
to just go smoother.  We are now seeing this to be a problem for officers from other 
counties that have not had the CIT training.  The hospital staff expects the officers 
to know and understand the lingo and know the new processes.  Officers from other 
counties are now at a disadvantage and hospital staff gets frustrated dealing with 
them. 
 
The interviews and focus group discussions indicated that CIT improved the 
hospital staff and police officer attitudes toward dealing with cases of mental health crisis 
and improved the processes by which cases are handled and people treated.  Through the 
implementation of CIT, police administrators were able to satisfy community and 
political pressure to ‘do something.’  They were also able to establish linkages and 
improved communication with the hospital.  This resulted in officers indicating that they 
are happy with the reduction in time that it takes to conduct an immediate detention, and 
therefore, are more willing to take a subject to the hospital. 
Hospital administrators and physicians appear more cooperative and willing to 
work with police officers when they arrive in the emergency room.  They also suggest 
that, due to the implementation of CIT, that internal hospital processes have been 
improved.  They also are happy with the improved avenues of communication to the 
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police department and the Monroe County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.  
Community mental health advocates are happy as well with the results of the 
Bloomington model of CIT training and the overall implementation of this program. 
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Chapter 3: Crisis Intervention Team Incident Outcomes 
 
3.1 Purpose of CIT Outcomes Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine officers’ responses to calls involving persons 
with mental illness. The objectives of the CIT program are to help officers recognize 
symptoms of mental illness, increase their use of mental health alternatives to arrest, and 
increase officer safety.  Thus, the specific research questions are: 
• Does CIT training affect the frequency with which officers report persons as 
having a mental illness? 
 
• Does CIT training affect how officers respond to and resolve incidents involving 
persons in mental health crisis? 
 
• Is there a difference in how CIT-trained and non-CIT trained officers resolve 
incidents involving mental health crisis? 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
Information on officers’ responses to mental health crisis calls come from data 
collection forms (CIT Statistics Sheet, version 3, see appendix) that were completed by 
officers immediately following any incident in which they came into contact with a 
person the officer believed suffered from a mental illness. Officers came into contact with 
subjects in various ways; most incidents involved officers being dispatched to the scene 
and some incidents involved officer observation or the subject making a complaint at the 
police station.  The BPD dispatch procedure did not identify particular calls as mental 
health crisis calls; thus, normal dispatch procedures did not change due to the 
implementation of the CIT program. Rather, officers were dispatched to all calls 
following normal procedures, regardless of their CIT training status.  This is different 
from some CIT programs where dispatchers identify a call as a mental health crisis and 
specifically dispatch a CIT officer.  The BPD procedure of dispatching officers regardless 
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of CIT training status and not directly identifying an incident as a mental health crisis or 
CIT call meant that officers directly identified calls as involving a mental health issue and 
officers self-selected to complete a CIT statistics sheet. 
Between June 28, 2006 and April 20, 2009, BPD officers completed 668 CIT 
statistics sheets. The variables measured with the CIT data collection form include such 
information as the officers CIT training status, demographic information for both officer 
and subject, the nature of incident, whether threats, violence or weapons were involved, 
prior contacts, drug or alcohol involvement, medication compliance, complainant 
relationship, behaviors evident at time of incident, techniques and equipment used to 
control the situation,  injury during police intervention, officer perceptions of symptoms 
and behaviors, where and by whom the subject was transported, and the case disposition. 
A full list of variables can be found in appendix C. Because one limitation of previous 
research has been the lack of comparison between CIT and non-CIT trained officers, the 
data collection form included the officer’s CIT training status, enabling comparisons 
between CIT and non-CIT trained officers who were willing to complete the CIT data 
collection forms.    
3.3 Officer and Subject Demographics 
 
The Bloomington Police Department (BPD) employed 92 sworn officers, 
including 80 male and 12 female officers.  The racial make-up of the sworn officers was 
86 Caucasian, 4 Black, 1 Hispanic, and 1 Asian. Approximately 53% (n=49) of the BPD 
officers received CIT training as of April 2009. The minimum length of time CIT trained 
officers were employed by BPD was 1.41 years and the maximum was 33.46 years, with 
an average number of years employed of 12.39, with a standard deviation of 8.34. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Table 3.1 indicates the demographics of officers who responded to the mental 
health crisis calls. One-half of the calls (51.7%) were responded to by officers between 
21 and 29 years old and the majority of the officers were Caucasian males.   
Approximately one-half of the calls were responded to by CIT trained officers. 
Characteristics of Officers Responding to Crisis Calls
Variable N
% calls 
responded 
to by:
Officer Demographics
     Age
          0-25 148 26.1
          26-29 145 25.6
          30-35 121 18.1
          36-39 34 6.0
          40-45 77 13.6
          46-49 15 2.7
          50+ 26 4.6
     Gender
          Male 481 82.1
          Female 105 17.9
     Race
          Asian 1 0.2
          Black 13 2.3
          Caucasian 540 94.4
          Hispanic 3 0.4
          Latino(a) 13 2.3
         Other 2 0.3
     CIT training status
          CIT trained 322 50.5
          Non-CIT trained 329 49.5
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Table 3.2 
 
Of the 668 calls, officers recorded the age of the subject in 634 of the incidents. 
The range of ages was 13 to 82. The mean age was 36.62 with a standard deviation of 14.  
The modal age was 20. 
Time Call Received 
Table 3.3 
 
Officers were asked to record the time they received the call from dispatch and 
the time they arrived at the scene.   
The average time of call received from dispatch was 13:10 hours with a standard 
deviation of 7.22, which suggests the calls were spread out evenly throughout the day.  
Variable N
% calls by 
subjects:
Age
     0-19 44 6.9
     20-29 209 33.0
     30-39 105 16.6
     40-49 163 25.7
     50-59 80 12.6
     60-69 19 3.0
     70-79 11 1.7
     80+ 3 0.5
Gender
     Male 338 51.3
     Female 321 48.7
Race
     Asian 10 1.5
     Black 35 5.4
     Caucasian 597 91.3
     Hispanic 8 1.2
     Other 4 0.6
Characteristics of Subjects
Variable N Mean SD
Time call received (time of day) 668 13:10 7.22
Officer response time (in minutes) 475 7 8
Length of call (in minutes) 234 28 5
Characteristics of Crisis Calls
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However, fewer calls were received in the early morning (roughly between 05:00 hours 
and 10:00 hours) with an increase of activity during the mid-morning to late afternoon.  
There was relatively few calls received from dispatch during the evening hours with an 
increase in the late evening (around 22:00 hours). 
Officer Response Time 
Officers recorded the time they received the call from dispatch and the time they 
arrived at the scene.  The "time to respond" variable was defined as only those calls 
where an officer had to respond to a scene location other than the police station (there 
were several instances where a subject walked into the police station and an officer 
assisted them).  In addition, there were several instances where the "time to respond" was 
calculated as zero.  These were excluded from this analysis as it was not clear whether 
the times recorded were inaccurate or if the officer witnessed the situation so that no 
dispatching call was issued.  Based on this definition, there were 475 cases included in 
this variable. The average response time for these 475 cases was 7 minutes, with a 
standard deviation of 8 minutes. The minimum was 1 minute and the maximum was 1 
hour 6 minutes.  The median and mode were 5 minutes.   
Length of Call 
The length of call is defined by the time the officer completed the call minus the 
time the officer arrived on the scene.  Officers recorded this information in 234 of the 
cases.  The average length of call was 28 minutes, with a standard deviation of 5 minutes. 
The minimum length of call was 2 minutes and the maximum length was 5 hours 57 
minutes.  In sum, the total time spent on the 234 crisis calls was approximately 194 
hours. Police spent 100 of these 194 hours “baby-sitting” the subject at the hospital.   
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Frequency of Police Intervention 
Figure 3.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Officers responded to a total of 668 calls that involved mental health crisis or 
mental health issues between June 28, 2006 and April 20, 2009.  There were a total of 
516 different subjects; 83.5% (n=431) of subjects required police intervention one time, 
10.9% (n=56) of subjects required police intervention twice, 2.9% (n=15) of subjects 
required police intervention three times, 0.96% (n=5) of subjects required police 
intervention four times, .058% (n=3) of subjects required police intervention five times, 
0.38% (n=2) of subjects required police intervention six times,  0 .19% (n=1) required 
police intervention seven times, .019% (n=1) required police intervention eight times, and 
0.39% (n=2) required police intervention nine times. Thus, approximately 16% of 
subjects required two or more police interventions.  This is four times the rate of what 
Skeem and Bibeau (2008) found in their study of Las Vegas CIT calls where 4% of 
subjects required police intervention two or more times (p. 202). 
During the focus groups, officers indicated that the mental health crisis calls they 
responded to involved repeated contacts with the same subjects.  However, these data 
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suggest that most subjects encountered police intervention only one time. Clearly there is 
a large discrepancy between the officers’ perceptions of who they encounter and their 
reported contacts in these data.  When, in focus groups, officers were asked about this 
discrepancy, one officer suggested: 
Honestly, I think the discrepancy is that the information we have to 
make a mental detention may be different than the information on a lot of 
calls that we go to.  We may encounter the same person but we may not 
have enough information to warrant a mental detention, but yet [sic] we 
may still see the mental issue, but the officer is not filling out the CIT 
forms on suspicious person calls or whatever types of calls we go to. We 
may not be filling out the CIT forms every time we see a person with a 
mental health issue. 
I know from my own personal experience that I have dealt with 
people who I have done a mental detention on before. I know he has 
mental issues. Like last night, because of medication compliance and the 
kinds of problems the subject has, he walks around like a normal person. 
The problem was that he was drinking, and he was a typical person who 
was drunk. So, I did not bother to fill out a CIT form despite my knowing 
that he has mental health issues. However, he was not displaying anything 
like that [symptoms of mental illness] tonight. 
 
 Thus, it appears that despite the instructions to officers to complete a form 
anytime they came into contact with a person with mental illness, officers were more 
likely to fill out a form when the particular incident was directly related to a mental 
health crisis.  As the focus group officer stated, he did not complete forms for incidents 
involving public intoxication or other incidents where the subject did not display outward 
symptomatic behavior.  Other officers in the focus group agreed that they did the same 
thing.  Therefore, it is clear that the data collected only included incidents where the 
subject was in mental health crisis or the incident was directly related to a mental health 
issue.  Given this, officers reiterated that they come into contact with the same mentally 
ill individuals over and over; however, the need for police action is fairly rare.  As the 
statistics indicated, very few subjects required more than one police intervention over a 
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three year period for a mental health crisis; however, it is possible that these same 
mentally ill subjects may have required police intervention on multiple occasions and 
may have been arrested without being identified as mentally ill; thus, it is unclear 
whether the CIT program’s goal of diverting mental ill subjects from jail to the hospital is 
reached. A methodological question arises about how we define which subjects are 
mentally ill and which subjects are actually diverted due to their mental health issues.  It 
is possible that mentally ill subjects engage in criminal behavior but are not identified by 
officers as either mentally ill or in mental health crisis and would thus not be included in 
data collected on CIT or mental health crisis calls. 
 This raises an interesting methodological issue where it is difficult to discern how 
officers identify a call as involving a subject with mental illness and if, and when, 
officers decided to complete a data collection form.  Skeem and Bibeau examined only 
calls “that were handled by the CIT team” (p. 202).  It is unclear whether CIT officers in 
their study were specifically dispatched to mental health crisis calls or how the incident 
was identified as a call involving a person with mental illness.  It is possible that subjects 
in Skeem and Bibeau’s study had additional police contacts or interventions that were 
never recorded.  Given the disparity between Skeem and Bibeau’s study where 
approximately 4% of calls were associated with two or more crisis events and my study 
involving 16% of subjects requiring repeated police intervention due to mental health 
issues, it is clear that the rate at which mentally ill subjects require police intervention 
and which subjects are actually diverted from the criminal justice system depends 
directly on how subjects and calls are defined and by whom these calls are identified. 
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Officers’ Perceptions of Subjects Mental Illness 
Table 3.4 
 
 On the CIT statistics sheets, officers indicated their beliefs that a subject suffered 
from a particular disease or disorder by placing a check mark in the box next to the 
appropriate option.  Officers could check all boxes that apply. 
 Of the 668 calls, officers identified a diagnosis in 246 of the cases (i.e. the officer 
was informed that the subject had received a diagnosis from a medical professional, or 
the officer indicated their opinion as to what mental illness the subject might suffer 
from). Although the 246 cases fell into seven different diagnostic categories, nearly all 
(96.4%) were to three Axis I diagnoses, bi-polar disorder, major depression, and 
schizophrenia. 
Incident Characteristics 
 Police encounter mentally ill persons for many different reasons.  They may be 
responding to potential criminal activity, to problems of public order, or in their role of 
parens patria. The CIT statistics sheet asked officers to indicate the nature of the incident 
and the subjects’ behaviors in twelve categories.  Officers could check “all that apply.” 
 
N % of calls
Officer believes subjects suffers from:
     Psychiatric disorder 524 78.4
     Developmental disability 14 2.1
     Alcoholism 87 13
     Drug addiction 50 7.5
     Other 88 13.2
Subjects diagnosis (as percieved by officer)
     Autism 2 0.8
     Bipolar disorder 72 29.3
     Dementia 1 0.4
     Depression 94 38.2
     HIV positive 2 0.8
     PTSD 4 1.6
     Schizophrenia 71 28.9
Officer's Perceptions of Subjects Mental Illness
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Table 3.5 
 
Table 3.5 indicates the percentage of calls by the type of the incident.  
Approximately one-half of the calls involved incidents of suicide threats or attempts and 
20.6% involved welfare checks.  Approximately 21% of the calls involved incidents of 
disorderly/disruptive behavior, but very few (6.7%) involved violence toward others. 
Similar to my findings, Skeem and Bibeau found that 45% of CIT events were suicide 
threats or attempts (p. 202).  In contrast, however, their study found that 25% of calls 
involved threats toward others. Skeem and Bibeau also reported that most of the incidents 
involved minor to moderate risk of violence potential (p 203-204).  Between their study 
and the current study, there is a methodological difference in how violence potential or 
threats to others is defined.  I asked officers to indicate whether a subject actually 
threatened another person; this resulted in 6.7% of incidents involving a threat toward 
others.  It is noteworthy that, as indicated in table 3.5, officers reported 21.7% of cases 
being related to disorderly or disruptive behavior.  It is possible that what was called 
minor risk in Skeem and Bibeau’s study may have been reported by officers in my study 
as disorderly or disruptive behavior and was thus not classified as a threat toward others.  
Clearly as research on CIT moves forward, there is need for further conceptualization on 
Type of Incident N % of Calls
     Disorderly/Disruptive 145 21.7
     Drug-related 33 4.9
     Judge Ordered Detention 8 1.8
     Neglect of Self Care 55 8.2
     Nuisance 28 4.2
     Public Intoxication 32 4.8
     Subject Complaint 35 7.5
     Subject Request Intervetion 28 6.4
     Suicide 336 50.3
     Theft/Property Crime 10 1.5
     Threats of Violence toward Others 45 6.7
     Welfare Check 96 20.6
     Other 120 18
Nature of Incident
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how to measure threats toward others and how research defines and measures violence 
potential. 
Table 3.6 
 
Table 3.6 indicates the percentage of calls by the type of behavior the subject 
displayed at the time of the incident. Officers could check “all that apply.” Almost one-
half of the calls involved subjects behaving depressed. Officers perceived approximately 
34% of subjects as manic or belligerent and a little over 60% of the cases as involving 
subjects experiencing delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, or 
disorientation/confusion. 
  
Type N % of calls
Belligerent 106 15.9
Delusions 115 17.2
Depressed 308 46.1
Disorganized Speech 118 17.7
Disorientation/confusion 135 20.2
Hallucinations 37 5.5
Manic 123 18.4
Unusually Frightened/Scared 58 8.7
Behaviors Evident at Time of Incident
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Table 3.7 
 
 On the CIT statistics sheet, officers were asked to indicate (by checking a box) 
whether or not the incident involved threats, violence and/or weapons.  The officers were 
asked to indicate the following: if the subject brandished a weapon and, if they did, what 
the weapon was, if the subject threatened violence toward another person and, if they did, 
toward whom, and if the subject injured or attempted to injure themselves.  
 As indicated by in Table 3.7, approximately 10% of the calls involved the subject 
brandishing a weapon.  The type of weapon brandished most often was a knife.  
Examining the call narratives from the CIT statistics sheets where a knife was involved 
indicates that the subject did not necessarily brandish the weapon against 'others', 
including the officer.  Rather the knife was present at the scene and, as indicated in the 
officer's narrative of the situation, the subject typically utilized or threatened to use the 
knife in a suicide gesture or attempt.  
N % of calls
Did subject use/brandish weapon? 66 10
     What type of weapon?*
          Knife 46 6.9
          Gun 12 1.8
          Other 12 1.8
Did subject threaten violence? 70 10.8
     Who was threatened?*
          Partner 10 1.5
          Mother 6 0.9
          Father 2 0.3
          Brother 3 0.4
          Sister 1 0.1
          Other family member 2 0.3
          Friend 5 0.7
          Stranger 7 0.7
          Officer 12 1.8
          Other 21 3.1
*percentage out of all 668 cases
Percent of cases where officer indicated subject use of 
Threat/Violence/Weapon
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 In the few cases (n=70) where an officer reported subjects as threatening violence 
toward others, 34% of these cases involved threats toward intimates (family members or 
partners), 17% of cases involved threats toward officers, 10% of cases involved threats 
toward strangers, and .07% of cases involved threats toward a friend (see table 3.7).  
According to the narratives written by police officers, the threats toward others 
predominately occurred prior to police arrival at the scene.  Very few incidents involved 
threats toward officers.  One goal of CIT is to reduce injury to officers.  These results 
suggest that officers rarely encounter threats of violence from subjects in mental health 
crisis. 
 In addition, of the 668 cases, officers indicated that 50.3% (n=336) of subjects 
attempted suicide or displayed suicide ideation.  Thus, subjects rarely threatened others; 
instead, subjects demonstrated self-injurious behavior. One officer in the focus group 
stated that “suicide cases are the easiest crisis calls to respond to.”  Officers in the focus 
group agreed that suicide calls were easy because by the time they arrived on the scene 
the subject was ready to go to the hospital.  Thus, there was little need for crisis de-
escalation or police intervention beyond transporting the subject to the hospital. 
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Table 3.8 
 
 Officers indicated that 35.7% of the cases did have evidence of drug or alcohol 
intoxication.  Of these cases, 60% (n=139) involved alcohol, 24.6% (n=59)  involved an 
"other" drug, which included prescription drugs such as hydrocodone and Loritab, over 
the counter drugs such as Tylenol PM and Excedrin, and non-prescription drugs such as 
marijuana and cocaine, 13.8% (n=33) of cases involved both alcohol and drugs. 
Officers indicated whether there were any injuries during the incident, who was 
injured, and the nature of the injury.  There were only two injuries to officers.  The 
majority of subject injuries were self inflicted suicide attempts occurring prior to police 
intervention.  Overall, injury to subjects was a rare event and injury during police 
intervention was an extremely rare event for both officer and subject. 
N % of calls
Evidence of drug/alcohol involvement 240 35.7
Medication compliance 88 13.9
Injury to*:
     Subject 44 6.6
     Family member 2 0.3
     Roomate 1 0.1
     Girlfriend 1 0.1
     Friend 1 0.1
     Stranger 1 0.1
     Officer 2 0.3
Type of Equipment/Technique used
     Handcuffs 172 25.7
     Verbalization 236 35.3
     OC Spray 0 0
     Baton 0 0
     Other (i.e. arm bar, leg restraints, open hand control techniques 35 5.2
Assessment of subject dangerousness
     Subject is danger to self 431 67.9
     Subject is danger to others 100 15.7
Disposition of incident
     Immediate detention 296 44.3
     Tranported to jail 24 3.6
     Charges pending 26 3.9
     Transported to hospital (requiring no further police involvement) 214 32
     Subject stabilized on scene 54 8.1
     Referral to mental health professional 26 3.9
     Other 72 10.8
Other Incident Characteristics
*many of the injuries were self inflicted occuring prior to police intervention
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As indicated in Table 3.8, 25.7% of incidents required the use of handcuffs, 
35.3% required the use of verbalization, and 5.2% required an "other" technique to 
control the subject during police intervention.  It is possible that a case required more 
than one of the above techniques.  
It is important to note, methodologically, that these measures specifically examine 
police actions or use of force during police intervention to control the subject. My 
conversations with the police chief prior to gathering data for this study revealed that the 
BPD policy is to handcuff all subjects during transport to either the hospital or jail.  Thus, 
it was necessary to indicate on the data collection form that the measure for the use of 
handcuffs (i.e. the use of force) excluded handcuffing for mandatory transport. Another 
important difference in the Bloomington context is that BPD officers no longer utilize 
Tasers.  Due to the fatal Taser incident at the jail in 2003, the BPD changed its equipment 
policy and no longer issued Tasers to officers. 
The use of handcuffs in my study was high when compared with the use of 
handcuffs reported in Skeem and Bibeau’s study.  Skeem and Bibeau reported that 
officers used handcuffs in 4 out of 655 incidents and had a total of 36 cases where an 
officer used “any type of force [or] any degree of force” (p. 203); thus, a degree of force 
was used by officers in approximately 5.5% of the Las Vegas CIT cases.  In my study, 
taking into consideration the use of handcuffs and any other measure of force (i.e. the 
“other” category, see table 3.8), approximately 40% of cases required some type of use of 
force. The discrepancy between my study and Skeem and Bibeau’s study may be a result 
of the differences in samples.   Skeem and Bibeau’s sample included only events where 
CIT trained officers handled the call.  My sample included both CIT and non-CIT trained 
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officers who identified the incident as involving a subject with a mental health issue and 
where those officers self-selected to complete the data collection form.  Thus, two 
methodological questions arise. First, how is the use of force being defined, who is 
defining it and how is it being measured.  Clearly, the use of handcuffs as a measure of 
force needs to be scrutinized depending on the police departments transport and handcuff 
policy.  Second, given the large discrepancy in the rates of use of force reported in my 
study as compared to Skeem and Bibeau’s study, the sample from which these results are 
drawn should be considered.  The types of calls that are identified as CIT calls require 
further conceptualization before generalizable conclusions can be drawn. 
As noted in Table 3.8, officers indicated the final disposition of each case.  Of the 
668 cases, 44.3% of subjects were immediately detained through 24 hour hold at the 
hospital, 32% were transported to the hospital on a voluntary basis, 8.1% were stabilized 
on the scene requiring no further police involvement, 3.9% were referred to a mental 
health professional, and 3.6% were transported to jail.  Twenty-six subjects were charged 
with an offense; 2 of these subjects were transported to the hospital and 24 subjects were 
transported directly to jail. Charge types included battery, criminal mischief, criminal 
trespass, disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, illegal entrance of residence, 
intimidation, public intoxication, outstanding warrants, theft, and possession of controlled 
substance. 
As noted in Chapter 1, research offers conflicting reports as to whether the goals 
of the CIT program in decreasing the use of arrest and increasing the use of 
hospitalization are met.  Bower et al. (2001) found that in Albuquerque, New Mexico 
police arrested fewer than 10% of subjects and transported 48% of the subjects to a 
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medical facility (p. 2).  However, Bower et al did not report whether there was any 
difference in arrest based on officer’s CIT training status.  Teller et al’s (2006) research 
in Akron, OH, found no significant differences in arrest based on the officers CIT 
training status.   In contrast, Skeem and Bibeau (2008) found that CIT officers “resolved 
most of the incidents through hospitalization and rarely resorted to arrest” (p. 204).   
Results from the current study indicate that over a 3 year period, 3.5% of crisis 
calls resulted in a disposition of arrest.  There was a difference between CIT and non-CIT 
trained officers likelihood of arrest; non-CIT trained officers were slightly more likely to 
arrest than were CIT trained officers (t=2.235, p=.026). CIT officers arrested subjects in 
2.2% of cases reported on compared to non-CIT officers arresting subjects in 4.9% of the 
reported cases. However, the results on arrest should be interpreted with caution.  The 
event of arrest is extremely rare.  The percent of arrests in this study was extremely low.  
As baseline data on arrest for crisis calls prior to the implementation of the CIT program 
was not available, it is unclear whether the low percentage of arrest is causally due to the 
CIT program.  In addition, while this research indicates a difference between CIT and 
non-CIT trained officers, the sample size of arrests was very small.  In addition, 
comparing this study’s results with previous research is problematic as each study has 
very different samples. Additionally, every police agency has different arrest policies and 
procedures and had different access to mental health alternatives which may be 
complicated by the context in which the CIT program is implemented and further 
managed. 
 
 
 64 
 
Despite the above discussion of samples, it is interesting to note that the arrest 
(4%) and hospitalization (74%) rates reported in Skeem and Bibeau’s study is relatively 
similar to the arrest (3.6%) and hospitalization (76%) rates reported from my sample of 
both CIT and non-CIT trained officers’ responses.  While there is difficulty in a directly 
comparing these samples, noting the similarities in arrest and hospitalization raises the 
question as to whether CIT trained officers actually choose hospitalization as an 
alternative disposition to arrest any differently than do non-CIT trained officers. 
Unfortunately, conclusions at this point, with the given data, are not possible. 
3.4 Officers’ Perceptions of Mental Illness 
 
3.4.1 Frequency of Reporting Mental Illness 
 
 One goal of CIT programs is to increase an officer’s ability to recognize mental 
illness and subsequently use that knowledge when deciding a final disposition of a mental 
health crisis event.  Most of the research on this topic includes vignette, focus group and 
pre/post CIT training surveys of officers.  Watson et al (2004) found that the label of 
certain diagnoses in the vignette did not affect the likelihood of arrest.  However, Watson 
(2004) found that officers’ perceived subjects with schizophrenia as less responsible for 
their actions, were more worthy of help, but were more dangerous.  Hanafi (2008) found 
that officers in focus groups appeared to have an increased ability to recognize and 
respond to subjects with mental illness, and appeared to divert such subjects toward 
hospitalization rather than arrest.  In a pre/post CIT training survey of officers, Wells et al 
(2006) suggest that CIT training achieves the goal of increasing officers’ ability to 
recognize mental illness.  Skeem and Bibeau (2008) suggest that their sample of CIT 
calls included cases where the officer knew the diagnosed mental disorder or where the 
subject was actively hallucination or delusional at the scene.  They claim that the known 
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mental disorder affected the likelihood with which subjects were prescribed psychotropic 
medication and of those subjects the likelihood that they were medication noncompliant.  
Skeem and Bibeau also assert that the known mental disorder affected the subjects’ 
likelihood of intoxication.  Finally, their results indicate that the final disposition of cases 
did not differ significantly based on the officers knowing the mental disorder, but that 
subjects’ with a known mental disorder were rated by officers having lower violence 
potential. 
 According to the results of the current study, officers were instructed to complete 
data collection forms whenever they encountered an incident that involved a subject with 
a mental health issue.  In this sample of 668 cases, CIT officers appeared more likely than 
non-CIT officers to indicate that the subject suffered from a psychiatric disorder 
(χ2=4.258, p=.03, α=.05).  CIT officers reported that 83% of the incidents involved 
subjects with a psychiatric disorder compared to non-CIT officers’ reports at 76%.  Thus, 
it appeared that CIT officers are more likely to recognize mental illness. However,  
logistic regression with CIT training status as the independent variable shows we gain 
nothing in predictive ability.  More importantly, however, we do not know from these 
data whether the subjects of these incidents are mentally ill because we do not know the 
actual diagnosis.  Officers simply indicated their perception that the subject had a mental 
illness. Officers did indicate the diagnosis (if known) of a subject.  However, it is unclear 
how the officer knows this information.  It may be that the officer received the diagnostic 
information from a family member or the subject themselves.  It may be that the officer 
utilized the knowledge gained (such as symptoms or prescribed medications) from CIT 
training or other various officer trainings to list the “known” diagnosis.  Thus, because 
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we do not have the psychiatric or medical records to confirm officers’ perceptions of 
known mental illness, it is impossible to determine with certainty that CIT training affects 
officers’ ability to recognize mental illness.  Examining this methodological issue in the 
study raises a methodological question about this and previous research.  This study 
included, we do not have the ability to say that officers, regardless of CIT training status, 
can recognize mental illness, nor can it be determined whether the label of mental illness 
affects officers’ responses to mental health crisis calls.  Reconceptualization of how 
research measures officers’ recognition of mental illness in the field and the effects of 
such recognition on call dispositions is sorely needed. 
3.5 Summary and Limitations 
 
 This analysis addressed three main questions: (1) does CIT training affect the frequency 
with which officers report persons as having a mental illness?, (2) how do officers respond to 
and resolve incidents involving persons in mental health crisis, and (3) are there significant 
differences between CIT and non-CIT trained officers? It appears that CIT training had little 
effect on the frequency of reporting subjects as mentally ill and a small effect on officers’ 
responses and resolutions to mental health crisis calls. However, these results are complicated by 
various methodological concerns. 
 With regard to the frequency with which officers report persons as having a mental 
illness, it is interesting to note that officers believe they had repeated contacts with the same 
subjects.  However, the results directly contradict this perception.  The analysis indicates that 
subjects require police intervention fairly rarely, with most requiring one police intervention 
over the three year period of this analysis. Thus, it appears that officers may have repeated 
informal contacts with the same subject, but rarely initiate official intervention (i.e. immediate 
detention or arrest).  This assertion is limited as there is some difficulty in collecting data on all 
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incidents involving persons with mental illness.  Officers indicated that they did not complete a 
data collection form unless the incident was directly related to a mental health crisis. Thus, data 
on all calls involving persons with mental illness was limited; thereby, estimating the frequency 
for all calls involving persons with mental illness was not possible. 
 The second and third questions addressed by this analysis were how did officers respond 
to and resolve incidents involving persons in mental health crisis and was there a significant 
difference between CIT and non-CIT trained officers.  Results indicate there was a difference in 
how CIT officers respond to and resolve mental health crisis calls; however, this difference was 
relatively small. 
 One goal of the CIT program is to decrease the arrests of persons with mental illness.  
The results of this study indicate that arrest of subjects with mental illness is a rare event.  
However, of the few arrests that did occur, there was a significant difference between CIT and 
non-CIT officers.  CIT officers arrested less often than did the non-CIT officers.  These results 
cannot be generalized as the sample size of subjects arrested was extremely small. In addition, 
because baseline arrest data for persons with mental illness is not available, it is not possible to 
say whether have a CIT program reduced arrests of persons with mental illness overall. 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
 This dissertation research had several goals. One goal was to design a study that 
shifted away from vignette and survey methodology toward examining actual officer 
encounter outcomes and comparisons between CIT and non-CIT trained officers.  Prior 
research on CIT lacks significant use of control or comparison groups and primarily 
focuses on officers’ attitudes and perceptions of persons with mental illness.  Due to the 
lack of rigorous methodological design, prior research in this area is limited in its 
generalizability.  In addition, the lack of comparisons between CIT and non-CIT trained 
officers and mental health crisis call outcomes makes it difficult to evaluate some of the 
most pressing questions about the effectiveness of CIT programs, including questions 
related to (1) arrest rates, (2) the use of immediate detention in hospitals, and (3) the 
community context in which the program is implemented. 
Utilizing comparisons between CIT and non-CIT trained officers, this research 
examined officers’ reactions to and resolutions of mental health crisis calls.  Three main 
questions were addressed: (1) does  CIT training affect the frequency with which officers 
report persons as having a mental illness?, (2) how do officers respond to incidents 
involving persons in mental health crisis?, and (3) is there a difference in how CIT 
trained and non-CIT trained officers respond to incidents involving mental health crisis? 
 An important question in the literature regarding CIT training has been whether 
the training increases officers’ ability to recognize mental illness and to differentiate 
among symptoms of mental illness.  The comparison of CIT and non-CIT trained officers 
in this study revealed CIT officers appear to recognize mental illness differently than do 
non-CIT officers.  Unfortunately, methodological questions arise as to whether officers’ 
perceptions of mental illness truly correlate with diagnoses that may be medically 
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confirmed.  The varied nature of crisis calls and how these calls are identified as 
involving persons with mental illness provide complex methodological limitations to the 
conclusions that may be drawn from self-selected, officer completed data collection 
forms. 
As to whether CIT training affects how officers respond to persons with mental 
illness, the results are mixed.  Most notably, CIT officers were as likely to use handcuffs 
as were non-CIT officers.  It is possible that officers, regardless of CIT training status, 
use higher measures of force, such as handcuffs, as a last resort. This is consistent with 
Morabito’s (2008) argument that characteristics of the case may dominate officers’ 
responses to mental health crisis calls.  Further research should look at whether the use of 
higher measures of force correlate with the type of call or type of crime. 
One of the most pressing questions about CIT is whether this program reduces the 
arrest of mentally ill subjects and increases the use of immediate detention.  Consistent 
with previous research, the rate of arrest for mental health crisis calls was extremely low 
in this study. Although it appears that CIT trained officers might be slightly less likely to 
arrest, the small number of cases in which there were arrests precludes more formal 
analysis. As a result, no conclusions about CIT’s effects on arrest can be drawn.  
Although this study is one of the first to provide comparisons of CIT and non-CIT 
trained officers’ responses in the field, there are limits to the conclusions that can be 
drawn.  First, the relative rarity of arrest makes it difficult to address crucial questions 
about the arrest of mentally ill persons.  This study includes 668 cases, a large sample by 
many standards, but it was still too small to examine the rare event of arrest in any detail.  
The data is further limited because information was collected via officers self selecting 
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when to complete a CIT Statistics Sheet.  In the focus groups, officers indicated that they 
did not complete a form for all cases involving subjects with mental illness. Thus, I do 
not know how many cases went unreported, nor do I know if CIT officers were more 
likely to fill out the forms.   
Second, there are concerns about the generalizability of these results.  This study 
was conducted in a relatively small city and thus may not be representative of all cities or 
cities with large populations.  More importantly, the CIT program studied was an 
adaption of the Memphis Model.  As the study brought to light, there is no standard of 
CIT training; both the content of and methods of training CIT officers may vary 
considerably from community to community making generalizations difficult. On the 
other hand, the BPD did retain the core elements of the Memphis Model of CIT.  The 
differences implemented by BPD were small and are in the direction one would expect 
given the size of the community and the resources available. In addition, while the 
Memphis Model was designed for a large city, most cities in the U.S. are not large and 
have varying community resources for the treatment of the mentally ill.  As the CIT 
program has been broadly and rapidly adopted across the U.S., one would expect that 
many smaller communities have implemented or are considering a CIT program.  Thus, 
the representativeness of city size was not a main concern of this study. 
 Another goal of this research was to explore the community context in which the 
CIT program was implemented.  When a community decides to implement a new 
program, the first question is why they decided to do so.  In the case of CIT programs, the 
assumption is that a problem exists with how police handle mental health crisis calls.  As 
this study shows, the problem may be defined differently by different actors. 
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In the case of Bloomington, the police department faced political and community 
pressure to implement a CIT program.  Police administrators and some mental health 
advocates believed that police were doing a good job handling crisis calls prior to CIT, 
but saw the value of such a program for political purposes. Hearing about the anecdotal 
successes of CIT in Fort Wayne prompted political and community pressure for BPD to 
implement a CIT program.  In addition, police administrators justified the CIT program 
saying that additional training of officers is always a good idea. The model of CIT 
adopted, however, was an issue of contention for some mental health advocates.  As BPD 
adapted the Memphis Model of CIT to fit the police departments and communities needs, 
some advocates believed that BPD did not have a true CIT program.  However, the 
majority of those interviewed disagree with the small number of advocates who believe 
in the strict adoption of the Memphis Model.  While there were a small number of 
advocates who wanted a strict adoption, it is unclear what the Memphis Model of training 
actually consists of; it appears that even for cities adopting the Memphis Model, there are 
contextual adaptations in many programs.  After three years of the BPD CIT program 
operating, most interviewees agreed that the contention over the adaptations was no 
longer an issue of concern. 
 An additional challenge of implementing the CIT program in Bloomington was 
the lack of linkages between the police department and the hospital. The Memphis Model 
of CIT was intended to reduce the adversarial nature between police and hospital 
institutions and required the cooperation of all parties to successfully function.  In the 
beginning, Bloomington police administrators attempting to implement the CIT program 
had difficulty getting the hospitals cooperation.  However, as the program progressed and 
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police administrators continued to push for hospital cooperation, the hospital eventually 
acceded; they eventually worked with police administrators to reduce long officer waiting 
periods in the emergency room and formalized procedures for immediate detentions.  As 
time passed, the CIT program facilitated a stronger and more effective linkage between 
the police department and the hospital. 
 Overall, one of the most important findings of this study is that the CIT program 
strengthens linkages between criminal justice and mental health agencies, and addresses 
political and community concerns about how the police handle mental health crisis calls.  
The Bloomington CIT program increased communication between stakeholders, 
addressed mental health advocates concerns about police treatment of mentally ill 
persons, and streamlined procedural processes, including processes for police initiated 
immediate detentions and hospital processes that reduced the length of time police 
officers spent babysitting subjects awaiting evaluation.  Thus, while CIT did not appear 
to have a large affect on how police officers respond to and resolve mental health crisis 
calls, the program did positively affect the community by, as one police administrator put 
it, “getting everyone on the same page and moving together toward the same goal of 
helping people that suffer from mental illness.”  
 Although this study addresses gaps in the research literature, there is continued 
need for methodologically rigorous research designs that might establish whether CIT 
training causes change in officers’ perceptions and responses to mental health crisis calls.  
There is also continued need for short, intermediate and long-term analysis of police 
responses to and resolutions of mental health crisis calls.  Finally, there are two areas of 
research that are sorely lacking. First, while this study included interviews with hospital 
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stakeholders to place the implementation of CIT in context, questions remain about 
hospital internal processes and how emergency staff respond to and resolve cases 
initiated by police intervention. Second, research should examine the perspectives of 
mentally ill subjects and the long term affects of immediate detention policies for 
subjects.   
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Appendix B – Study Information Sheet 
IRB Study #07-12601 
 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON 
 
STUDY INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
Police Intervention in Mental Health Crisis: A Case Study of the Bloomington 
 Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Program 
 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study of the Bloomington Crisis Intervention Program.  
You were selected as a possible subject because study because you have been identified as a 
police officer employed by the Bloomington Police Department. We ask that you read this form 
and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
The study is being conducted by the principal investigator Cindy Stewart, Indiana University, 
Criminal Justice Department.   
 
STUDY PURPOSE 
 
Your police department is participating in a research study of police officers perceptions of and 
responses to calls involving persons in mental health crisis.  The objective of this study is to 
examine differences in police response to persons with mental illness and whether police officers 
that have taken the crisis intervention training course respond differently than those officers who 
have not taken the training course.  The goal is to provide the police department with evidence 
based information about police based crisis intervention. 
 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
You will be one of 128 police officers employed by the Bloomington Police Department who will 
be participating in this research. 
 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY: 
 
You are asked to do the following things: 
 
You will be asked to complete a Crisis Intervention Statistics Sheet at the end of each call that 
involves a mental health crisis.  A mental health crisis call might include situations where a 
person suffers from a psychiatric disorder, developmental disability, alcohol or drug addiction, or 
other mental health related issue.  The Crisis Intervention Statistics Sheet will ask you about the 
call, your perceptions of the call, and what actions you took to solve or complete the call.  At the 
end of each shift, you are asked to turn in any Crisis Intervention Statistics Sheets you’ve 
completed to the designated CIT Coordinator, who will then give all of the completed Sheets to 
the principal researcher. 
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You will be asked to continue to complete these Sheets for inclusion in this study until June 30, 
2009.   
 
RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
While on the study, the risks are: 
 
The Crisis Intervention Statistics Sheet gathers personal information, including your name, age, 
race and gender.  There is a small risk of loss of confidentiality. However, the principal 
investigator will make every attempt to protect your confidentiality (please see Confidentiality 
below).  At the end of the study (approximately October 30, 2009), all identifying information 
will be removed from the Sheet and from the study entirely to protect your confidentiality.   
 
 
BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
The benefits to participation that are reasonable to expect are: 
 
The information you provide in this study will help us to know more about how police officers 
respond to calls involving persons in mental health crisis.  This information may aid police 
departments and other agencies in developing crisis intervention training programs or other 
programs designed to aid police officers and/or persons in mental health crisis. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential.  We cannot guarantee 
absolute confidentiality.  Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law.  Your 
identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study may be published and databases 
in which results may be stored. Data gathered will be kept in locked filing cabinets and secured 
computer databases and only reported as aggregate data.  The computers will be kept in locked 
rooms and will also be protected by password.  Only the Principal Investigator will have access to 
these passwords. At the end of the study (approximately October 30, 2009), all identifying 
information will be permanently deleted from the Crisis Intervention Statistics Sheets and 
computer databases. 
 
Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality assurance and data 
analysis include groups such as the study investigator and his/her research associates, the IUB 
Institutional Review Board or its designees, and (as allowed by law) state or federal agencies, 
specifically the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP). 
 
COSTS 
 
There are no added costs to participate in this study. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
You will not receive payment for taking part in this study.   
 
COMPENSATION FOR INJURY  
 
Since you are completing this form on duty, you will follow office policy on compensation for 
injury, it will not be provided via this study. 
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CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
For questions about the study or a research-related injury, contact the researcher Cindy Stewart at 
812-855-9325 or cmcnair@indiana.edu.   
 
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, complaints or 
concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, or offer input, contact the IUB Human 
Subjects office, 530 E Kirkwood Ave, Carmichael Center, L03, Bloomington IN 47408, 812-855-
3067 or by email at iub_hsc@indiana.edu 
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Appendix B – Interview Schedule 
Interview Schedule 
 
The principal investigator will utilize the follow set of questions as a guide in this semi-structured 
interview.  The interviewee is encouraged to elaborate upon areas of interest to him/her.  The 
principal investigator will ask the following questions in the order that seems appropriate for the 
conversation to continue in the most unobstructed manner.  Questions not included in the 
following set may arise during the interview.  Responses to these unanticipated questions will be 
included in the final analysis. 
 
The interviewee will be asked to sign an informed consent form and will receive a copy of the 
form for their records. 
 
The interview will be audio taped. The length of the interview will depend upon the length of the 
interviewee’s responses.  However, it is expected that the interview will last approximately 1 
hour. 
 
Questions for principal investigator to pose to initiate and continue conversation: 
 
1. What do you see as the main problem the police department faces with respect to officers 
responding to mental health crisis calls? 
2. How well prepared do you think police officers are to handle persons in mental health 
crisis? 
3. How helpful are the linkages between the police department and medical institutions in 
providing officers assistance with mental health crisis calls? 
4. How effective is the CIT Program? 
5. Has the implementation of this program been a positive experience for you? for your 
agency? 
6. What problems or complications have you or your agency experienced since the 
implementation of the CIT program? 
7. Are there areas of training that you’d like to see incorporated into the CIT training? 
8. Are you concerned about any aspect of the CIT training and/or its deviation from the 
Memphis Model?  In what ways do you think the BPD CIT program has deviated from 
the Memphis Model? 
9. What positive outcomes do you see from the implementation of the CIT Program? 
10. What disadvantages do you see from the implementation of the CIT program? 
11. Do you think your attitude toward the CIT program changed from its implementation to 
now?  How?  Why? 
12. Do you think your agencies attitude toward the CIT program has changed from its 
implementation to now? How? Why? 
 
With respect to the linkages between the police department and other medical or mental health 
services: 
 
13. Do you believe the linkages were established primarily due to the implementation of the 
CIT program?  
14. Describe the strength of these linkages.   
15. During the implementation process, were there obstacles to establishing these linkages?   
16. Do you think these obstacles have been overcome? How? 
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Appendix B – Interview Consent Form 
 
IRB Study #07-12601 
 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON 
 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
Interview 
 
Police Intervention in Mental Health Crisis: A Case Study of the Bloomington 
 Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Program 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study of the Bloomington Crisis Intervention Program.  
You were selected as a possible subject because study because you have been identified as 
stakeholder in the Bloomington CIT Program. A stakeholder is defined as persons involved in the 
design, implementation and/or management of the CIT Program.  We ask that you read this form 
and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
The study is being conducted by the principal investigator Cindy Stewart, Indiana University, 
Criminal Justice Department.   
 
 
STUDY PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine stakeholder’s perceptions of (1) the implementation of the 
Bloomington CIT Program, (2) the community linkages created through the CIT Program, and (3) 
the perceived effectiveness of the program.  
 
 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
If you agree to participate, you will be one of 10 subjects who will be participating in this 
interview research. 
 
 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY: 
 
If you agree to be in the study, you will do the following things: 
 
This interview will inquire about your opinions related to the Bloomington CIT Program, 
including your perceptions of the implementation process, the community linkages established by 
the implementation of this program, and your opinions about the effectiveness of the program. 
 
The interview will be audio taped and transcribed by the principal investigator, Cindy Stewart.  
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The interview will last approximately 1 hour 
 
If you decide to participate in this interview, the researcher will ask you a series of questions 
about your perceptions of the Bloomington CIT Program. Your taped interview will be 
transcribed and utilized for analysis.  If you agree, quotations from this interview may be used. 
You may be identified as belonging to a specific group of stakeholders, such as medical 
professional, police personnel, or mental health advocate; however, your name and agency 
affiliation will be kept confidential 
 
RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
While on the study, the risks are: 
 
There is the potential for social risk (embarrassment) if your responses were to be disclosed. 
However, you will be identified as a police officer and the principal investigator will take steps to 
reduce the likelihood of responses or potential quotes from divulging your identity.  
 
Your responses will not be linked to you personally.  However, it may be possible, due to the 
nature of your response, or level of specificity in your response to a certain question that your 
identity may be determined by others.   
 
There also may be other risks that we cannot predict. 
 
BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
The benefits to participation that are reasonable to expect are: 
 
The information you provide in this interview will help us to know more the CIT implementation 
process and its perceived effectiveness.  This information may aid police departments and other 
agencies in developing crisis intervention training programs or other programs designed to aid 
police officers and/or persons in mental health crisis. 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
Instead of being in the study, you have these options:  
 
An alternative to participating in this study is to choose not to participate. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential.  We cannot guarantee 
absolute confidentiality.  Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law.  Your 
identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study may be published and databases 
in which results may be stored. The principal investigator will maintain the audiotapes in a secure 
location.  Audio tapes will be destroyed by the principal investigator at the end of the study 
(approximately October 30, 2009).  Prior to their destruction, the audio tapes will be transcribed 
by the principal investigator; your personal information (your name, age, race, affiliation) will not 
be included in this transcription.   
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Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality assurance and data 
analysis include groups such as the study investigator and his/her research associates, the IUB 
Institutional Review Board or its designees, and (as allowed by law) state or federal agencies, 
specifically the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP). 
 
COSTS 
 
There are no added costs to participate in this study. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
You will not receive payment for taking part in this study.   
 
COMPENSATION FOR INJURY  
 
In the event of physical injury resulting from your participation in this research, necessary 
medical treatment will be provided to you and billed as part of your medical expenses.  Costs not 
covered by your health care insurer will be your responsibility.  Also, it is your responsibility to 
determine the extent of your health care coverage.  There is no program in place for other 
monetary compensation for such injuries.  However, you are not giving up any legal rights or 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
For questions about the study or a research-related injury, contact the researcher Cindy Stewart at 
812-855-9325 or cmcnair@indiana.edu.   
 
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, complaints or 
concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, or offer input, contact the IUB Human 
Subjects office, 530 E Kirkwood Ave, Carmichael Center, L03, Bloomington IN 47408, 812-855-
3067 or by email at iub_hsc@indiana.edu 
 
 
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY 
 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or may leave the study at 
any time.  Leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
entitled.  Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or 
future relations with the investigator(s). 
 
 
SUBJECT’S CONSENT 
 
In consideration of all of the above, I give my consent to participate in this research study.   
 
I will be given a copy of this informed consent document to keep for my records.  I agree to take 
part in this study. 
 
 
 
Subject’s Signature: Date:                    
 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: Date:  
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Appendix B – Focus Group Consent 
 
IRB Study #07-12601 
 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON 
 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
Focus Group  
 
Police Intervention in Mental Health Crisis: A Case Study of the Bloomington 
 Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Program 
 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study of the Bloomington Crisis Intervention Program.  
You were selected as a possible subject because study because you have been identified as a 
police officer participating in the Bloomington CIT Program. We ask that you read this form and 
ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.  
 
The study is being conducted by the principal investigator Cindy Stewart, Indiana University, 
Criminal Justice Department.   
 
STUDY PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine officers’ perceptions of (1) the implementation of the 
Bloomington CIT Program, (2) the community linkages created through the CIT Program, and (3) 
the perceived effectiveness of the program.  
 
 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
If you agree to participate, you will be one of 16 subjects who will be participating in this focus 
group research. 
 
 
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY: 
 
If you agree to be in the study, you will do the following things: 
 
The approach of the research is exploratory focus groups. A focus group is a small group of 
people (about 8) who meet together and provide opinions to some questions asked by a group 
leader and participate in conversation with others involved in the group. You will be asked some 
questions about your opinions related to the Bloomington CIT Program, including your 
perceptions of the implementation process, the community linkages established by the 
implementation of this program, and your opinions about the effectiveness of the program.  
 
The focus group will be audio taped and transcribed by the principal investigator, Cindy Stewart.  
 
The focus group will last approximately 1-1 ½ hours. 
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Comments you make during this focus group may be quoted.  In conjunction with that quotation, 
you may be identified as police personnel or as a police officer; however, your name any other 
identifying information will be kept confidential 
 
RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
While on the study, the risks are: 
 
There is the potential for social risk (embarrassment) if your responses were to be disclosed. 
However, you will be identified as a police officer and the principal investigator will take steps to 
reduce the likelihood of responses or potential quotes from divulging your identity.  
 
Your responses will not be linked to you personally.  However, it may be possible, due to the 
nature of your response, or level of specificity in your response to a certain question that your 
identity may be determined by others.   
 
There also may be other side effects that we cannot predict. 
 
BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
The benefits to participation that are reasonable to expect are: 
 
The information you provide in this focus group will help us to know more the CIT 
implementation process and its perceived effectiveness.  This information may aid police 
departments and other agencies in developing crisis intervention training programs or other 
programs designed to aid police officers and/or persons in mental health crisis. 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO TAKING PART IN THE STUDY: 
 
Instead of being in the study, you have these options:  
 
An alternative to participating in this study is to choose not to participate. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential.  We cannot guarantee 
absolute confidentiality.  Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law.  Your 
identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study may be published and databases 
in which results may be stored. The principal investigator will maintain the audiotapes in a secure 
location.  Audio tapes will be destroyed by the principal investigator at the end of the study 
(approximately October 30, 2009).  Prior to their destruction, the audio tapes will be transcribed 
by the principal investigator; your personal information (your name, age, race, and rank) will not 
be included in this transcription.   
 
Organizations that may inspect and/or copy your research records for quality assurance and data 
analysis include groups such as the study investigator and his/her research associates, the IUB 
Institutional Review Board or its designees, and (as allowed by law) state or federal agencies, 
specifically the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP). 
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COSTS 
 
There are no added costs to participate in this study. 
 
PAYMENT 
 
You will not receive payment for taking part in this study.   
 
COMPENSATION FOR INJURY  
 
In the event of physical injury resulting from your participation in this research, necessary 
medical treatment will be provided to you and billed as part of your medical expenses.  Costs not 
covered by your health care insurer will be your responsibility.  Also, it is your responsibility to 
determine the extent of your health care coverage.  There is no program in place for other 
monetary compensation for such injuries.  However, you are not giving up any legal rights or 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
 
For questions about the study or a research-related injury, contact the researcher Cindy Stewart at 
812-855-9325 or cmcnair@indiana.edu.   
 
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems, complaints or 
concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, or offer input, contact the IUB Human 
Subjects office, 530 E Kirkwood Ave, Carmichael Center, L03, Bloomington IN 47408, 812-855-
3067 or by email at iub_hsc@indiana.edu 
 
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY 
 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or may leave the study at 
any time.  Leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
entitled.  Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or 
future relations with the investigator(s). 
 
 
SUBJECT’S CONSENT 
 
In consideration of all of the above, I give my consent to participate in this research study.   
 
I will be given a copy of this informed consent document to keep for my records.  I agree to take 
part in this study. 
 
 
 
Subject’s Signature: Date:  
             
(must be dated by the subject) 
 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: Date:   
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Appendix B – Focus Group Schedule 
 
Focus Group Schedule 
 
Focus group methodology uses group interaction to explore participants’ knowledge, 
experiences and opinions about a particular topic.  A group leader (in this study the 
principal investigator) encourages participants to explore areas that are important to them 
and encourages participants to pose and respond to their own and other participants’ 
questions or comments. Thus, the following set of questions is designed to initiate 
conversation between participants of the focus group. However, the conversation will not 
be limited by these questions or the principal investigator.  The principal investigator will 
attempt to limit interjections into the conversation, except where prompting to initiate or 
continue conversation is warranted. 
 
Focus group participants will be asked to sign an informed consent form and will receive 
a copy of the form for their records. 
 
The focus groups will be audio taped. The focus group will last 1-1/2 hours. 
 
Potential questions for principal investigator to pose to initiate conversation: 
 
1. What do you see as the main problem this department faces with respect to 
officers responding to mental health crisis calls? 
 
2. How well prepared are you to handle persons in mental health crisis? 
 
3. How helpful are the linkages between the police department and medical 
institutions in providing you assistance with mental health crisis calls? 
 
4. How effective is the CIT Program? 
 
5. Has the implementation of this program been a positive experience?  
 
6. What problems or complications have you experienced since the implementation 
of this program? 
 
7. Are there areas of training that you’d like to see incorporated into CIT training? 
 
8. Would you voluntarily participate in a follow-up CIT training session? 
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Appendix C: Variables 
 
 Variables and Attributes 
  
Variable Attributes 
Officer Characteristics  
  Officer number Number assigned by primary instructor 
  Law enforcement agency Bloomington, Fort Wayne, Indianapolis, Largo, Portland 
  Officer training status CIT, non-CIT 
  Officer Age Numerical age 
  Officer gender Male, Female 
  Officer race Asian, Black, Caucasian, Hispanic, Other (list) 
  
Subject Characteristics  
  Subject ID# Number assigned by primary investigator 
  Subjects Age Numerical age 
  Subject Gender Male, Female 
  Subject Race Asian, Black, Caucasian, Hispanic, Other (specify) 
  Diagnosis Diagnosis given by medical professional (if known) 
  
Call Characteristics  
  Date of call Month/day/year 
  Officer response time Time call received 
 Time arrived at scene 
 Time finished with call 
  Scene location Location of subject at time of officer response 
  Nature of Incident Disorderly/disruptive behavior, drug-related offense, judge 
   ordered detention, neglect of self care, nuisance, public 
   intoxication, suicide threat/attempt/completion, subject 
   complaint, subject requesting intervention, theft/other property 
 
  crime, threats of violence to others, welfare check, Other 
(specify), 
   no information available 
  Threats/Violence/Weapons  
     Subject brandished weapon   
          -during intervention Yes, no, don’t know 
          - type of weapon Knife, gun, other (specify) 
    Subject threaten other Yes, no, don’t know 
         -to whom Write in who was threatened: i.e. partner, officer, stranger etc) 
    Subject injury (prior to police intervention) Yes, no, don’t know 
  
  Prior contacts  
    Subject known person Yes, no, don’t know 
    Repeat call (within 24 hours) Yes, no, don’t know 
  
  Drug/alcohol involvement  
    Evidence of drug/alcohol intoxication Yes, no, don’t know 
        -if yes… Alcohol, other drug (specify), don’t know 
    Medication compliance Yes, no, don’t know 
        -specify medications if known Write in medication name 
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  Complainant relationship 
Partner/spouse, boyfriend/girlfriend, parent, sibling, 
friend/acquaintance, 
     
  business owner, other family member, police observation, other 
stranger 
    
  
  Behaviors evident at time of incident 
Disorientation/confusion, delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 
speech, 
 
  manic, depressed, unusually scared/frightened, belligerent or 
uncooperative 
   no information available, other (specify) 
  
  Incident injuries  
    during police intervention Yes, no, don’t know 
        -if yes, who was injured Write in, i.e. subject, officer, bystander, etc. 
        -nature of injury Write in nature of injury 
  
  Disposition of case 
Immediate detention, transport to jail, transport to 
medical/treatment facility, 
   subject stabilized on scene, referral to mental health professional, 
   other (specify) 
  
  Charges pending Write in pending charges 
  
  Equipment/technique Handcuffs, verbalization, OC spray, baton, other (specify) 
  
  Subject Transported Hospital, home/group home, homeless shelter, jail, other (specify) 
        -by whom   officer, ambulance, other (specify) 
 
Officer Beliefs  
  Officer believes subject suffers from: Psychiatric disorder, developmental disability, alcohol addiction, 
   drug addiction, other (specify) 
  
  Officer believes subject is: Danger to self, danger to others 
  
Narrative Questions  
  Describe in detail harmful acts or threats of harmful acts which indicate the person is dangerous to self or others 
  Indicate any further details of the incident that you feel are important 
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